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Abstract
This paper presents a soundness and completeness proof for propositional intu-
itionistic calculus with respect to the semantics of computability logic. The latter
interprets formulas as interactive computational problems, formalized as games
between a machine and its environment. Intuitionistic implication is understood
as algorithmic reduction in the weakest possible — and hence most natural —
sense, disjunction and conjunction as deterministic-choice combinations of prob-
lems (disjunction = machine’s choice, conjunction = environment’s choice), and
“absurd” as a computational problem of universal strength.
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1 Introduction
Computability logic (CL), introduced in [6], is a framework and program for redevel-
oping logic as a formal theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of
truth which it has more traditionally been. Unlike many nonclassical visions, the most
notable examples being intuitionistic and linear logics, CL is not an axiomatically con-
ceived approach. Rather, it was born as a pure semantics, leaving the task of finding
corresponding axiomatizations (syntax) as a challenge for future efforts. While [6] did
not prove any syntactic results, it did take the risk of stating conjectures regarding
the soundness and completeness (adequacy) of certain deductive systems with respect
to the semantics of CL. Among the systems conjectured to adequately axiomatize a
fragment of otherwise much more expressive CL was Heyting’s intuitionistic calculus
INT in its full predicate-level language. The first step toward a positive verification
of that conjecture was made in [12], where its soundness part was proven. The next
step forward came in [13], where the implicative fragment of INT was proven to be
complete. Generalizing and further advancing the methods used in [13], the present
paper tells the success story of a third step, proving the completeness of the full propo-
sitional fragment Int of INT with respect to the semantics of CL. To reduce the degree
of reliance on prior (and not yet officially published) work, this paper also includes a
soundness proof for Int, the result already known from [12] for the more expressive
INT. In a reasonably optimistic scenario, the last step toward a full verification of the
above conjecture will be extending the present propositional-level completeness proof
to the predicate level, probably building upon the ideas and techniques developed in
this article.
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The sheer size of the present paper suggests that the CL-adequacy proof for intu-
itionistic logic is far from trivial. This may give rise to a naive question in the following
style. There are already many semantics — Kripke models, algebraic or topological
interpretations, etc. — with respect to which intuitionistic logic has been proven to be
adequate. So why bother studying yet another semantics, with apparently by an order
of magnitude more complex proofs of the corresponding adequacy theorems? Further-
more, the CL semantics is in fact a game semantics. Then why not just be happy with,
say, Lorenzen’s [17] game semantics, which has been around since long ago?
CL has the following words for the doubtful. If simplicity is most important, why
not indeed put aside this (and any other) paper and focus on ... the empty logic with
the semantics that ... falsifies everything. Or if, for some reason, you want to deal with
intuitionistic and only intuitionistic logic, here is an idea: consider the semantics where
truth, by definition, means provability in Heyting’s calculus. You got a one-line-long
definition of the whole semantics together with a proof of adequacy. Or if, for some
reason, you want the semantics to be by all means a game semantics, how about this
one: Every formula F is a game between Proponent and Opponent. The first move
is by Proponent, consisting in presenting a tree T of formulas with F at its root and
claiming that T is a proof of F . The next move is by Opponent, consisting in choosing
a node G of T and claiming that T has an error at G. Opponent wins if and only if G
(indeed) is neither an axiom nor does it follow from its children by any of the inference
rules of Heyting’s calculus. Sure adequacy is guaranteed: Proponent has a winning
strategy for F if and only if F is provable. Or maybe you want something (pretending
to be) more “serious”, such as, say, games involving traversing a potential proof tree
T for F starting from its root, where, at each step, depending on what rule is claimed
(by Proponent) to justify the node, either Proponent or Opponent chooses a child? No
problem, give me ten minutes and half a page, I will produce precise definitions and
an adequacy proof. Or maybe ...
OK, that’s enough. Hopefully the point has been made. It is always possible to come
up with some sort of a “semantics” with respect to which the system under question
is sound and complete. And there are no limits to how simple — or the opposite —
both the semantics and the corresponding adequacy proofs can be. But the point is:
what is the point? The term semantics has often been abused in the logical literature,
resulting in a depreciation of its originally noble meaning. What has often been sold
as the real thing has in fact been not too far from the parodies of semantics seen in
the previous paragraph. This sort of unfair game has typically been motivated by the
desire to justify, at any cost, one or another popular syntactic construction.
Wrong. According to the credo of CL, it is syntax that should be a faithful servant
to a meaningful and motivated semantics rather than vice versa. This is so because
CL sees logic as a tool for “successfully navigating the real world” ([10]). And the true
purpose of a semantics — of one with a capital ‘S’ — should be providing a bridge
between that real, outside world and the man-made world of otherwise meaningless
symbolic expressions and proofs of formal logic. Without achieving this goal the se-
mantics, whether technically a game semantics or not, would be nothing but just a
game. Adjusting a semantics to the needs of some beautiful or otherwise appealing
syntax, which has been done so often by so many logicians, would be fine if it was pos-
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sible to simultaneously make adjustments in that real, outside world. Unfortunately,
however, the real world — at least at the level of abstraction suitable for logic —
remains largely beyond the control of a man.
The semantics of classical logic is the model example of a semantics with a capital
‘S’. Among the semantics for intuitionistic logic that are on the “capital-S” side one
could name the formulas-as-types approach (Curry-Howard isomorphism) and Arte-
mov’s [1] semantics of proofs, even though, in their general spirits and philosophies,
these two are very different from the approach of CL. The algebraic or Kripke semantics
fall under another category, to which [10] refers as “lowercase ‘s’ semantics”. These
are often very useful in analyzing and understanding given syntactic constructions, but
in most cases cannot be treated as independent justifications for those constructions:
an attempt to see more than syntax-serving technical tools in these sorts of seman-
tics, as pointed out in [10], may yield a vicious circle. The same obviously applies to
Lorenzen’s game semantics for intuitionistic logic. To many questions in the style “but
why this and not another way?”, it essentially has no other answer but the circular
“because this is necessary to achieve the adequacy of Heyting’s calculus”. Another
serious disadvantage of Lorenzen’s semantics before those of classical or computability
logics is that, while it talks about validity, a concept of truth is inherently absent in it,
signifying that applied theories (say, arithmetic) could not be meaningfully based on
that semantics, even if pure logic could.
Blass’s [2, 3] game semantics, which happens to be the closest precursor of the
semantics of computability logic, deserves a special comment. A detailed discussion
of what is common and different between the two is given in Sections 13 and 27 of
[6], and we will not elaborate on this topic here. It should be noted that, unlike
Lorenzen’s game semantics, there are no artificially tuned elements in Blass’s semantics,
to which it owes a great degree of naturalness and appeal. And, as early as in 1972, the
propositional fragment of intuitionistic logic was found to be sound with respect to it.
Unfortunately, no further technical progress has been made in that promising direction,
and the questions on predicate-level soundness or whatever-level completeness have
been remaining unanswered since then.
Computability logic is not modest about claiming that it offers a capital-‘S’ seman-
tics in the proper sense. Trying to convince the reader that there are good reasons
for such a claim is outside the scope of the present paper. This job has been done in
[6, 9, 10]. Below we only give an atrociously brief (by the standards of CL) overview
of the intuitions pertaining to the relevant fragment of CL.
That relevant fragment — let us call it the intuitionistic fragment — is obtained
by restricting the otherwise more expressive (and, in fact, open-ended) formalism of
CL to the logical vocabulary { ◦– ,⊔,⊓,⊔,⊓, $}, with these six items intended as the
readings of the intuitionistic implication, disjunction, conjunction, existential quanti-
fier, universal quantifier and absurd, respectively. Negation is not formally present as
a primitive symbol here, but is rather understood as an abbreviation defined by
The intuitionistic negation of F = F ◦– $.
The semantics of computability logic is indeed a game semantics. And games in
it are indeed not “just games”. They are seen as formal equivalents of our broadest
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intuition of computational problems, specifically, computational problems in their most
general — interactive — sense. Computability, or algorithmic solvability, of such prob-
lems is understood as existence of an interactive Turing machine that wins the game
no matter how the other player, which is the environment or the user, behaves. In
this vision of logic, computability replaces the classical concept of truth, operations on
games=problems replace Boolean connectives and quantifiers, and the understanding of
logical formulas as (representing) computational problems comes in the place of their
classical understanding as true/false statements, with valid formulas now describing
universally correct principles of computability (“always computable” problems), and
the logic in whole providing a systematic answer to the question on what and how can
be algorithmically solved.
There is a host of the most basic and natural operations on interactive compu-
tational problems, and those represented by the operators of intuitionistic logic are
among them. So, computability logic and its intuitionistic fragment in particular are
logics of problems in a direct and proper sense. This reminds us of the famous the-
sis set forth by Kolmogorov [16] in 1932, and a number of unsuccessful (in that no
adequacy was achieved) attempts to materialize it, such as Kleene’s realizability [14],
Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation [5] or Medvedev’s finite-problem semantics [18]. Ac-
cording to Kolmogorov’s thesis, stated at the philosophical level rather than in clear
technical terms, intuitionistic logic is a logic of problems. CL materializes this abstract
philosophy by turning it into a precise mathematics, only for a more expressive formal
language than that of intuitionistic logic, with the latter being a modest fragment of
the former.
In what follows we briefly survey the “intuitionistic” operations of computability
logic. Among the other operations officially introduced so far within the framework of
CL are negation ¬, parallel connectives ∨,∧, parallel quantifiers ∨,∧, strict reduction
→, blind quantifiers ∃,∀, parallel recurrences ∨| , ∧| , branching recurrences ◦| , ◦| . Detailed
intuitive explanations and formal definitions for all these operations, along with the
“intuitionistic” ones, can be found in [10].
The operators ⊓,⊔,⊓,⊔ are called choice operators in CL, because they represent
(deterministic) choice steps in the course of interaction between a machine and its
environment. The choice disjunction A1 ⊔ A2 of games A1 and A2 is the game where
the first move is by the machine. The move should be ‘1’ or ‘2’, amounting to selecting
the left or the right disjunct. After such a move i ∈ {1, 2} is made, the play continues
and the winner is determined according to the rules of the chosen component Ai. And
if the machine simply fails to make any move/choice, then it is considered to have lost.
Choice conjunction A1 ⊓ A2 is defined in exactly the same way, only with the roles of
the machine and the environment interchanged. That is, the initial move i ∈ {1, 2} in
A1 ⊓ A2 is the environment’s privilege and obligation. As for choice quantifiers, with
{1, 2, 3, . . .} being the universe of discourse, they can be understood as infinite versions
of ⊔ and ⊓, defined by
⊔xA(x) = A(1) ⊔ A(2) ⊔ A(3) ⊔ . . .
and
⊓xA(x) = A(1) ⊓ A(2) ⊓ A(3) ⊓ . . .
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For instance, where f(x) is a function, ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
is the game in which the first
move is by the environment, consisting in specifying a particular value m for x. Such
a move, which intuitively can be seen as asking the machine the question “what is the
value of f(m)?” brings the game down to the position ⊔y
(
y = f(m)
)
. The next step
is by the machine, who should specify a value n for y, further bringing the game down
to n = f(m). The latter is understood as a moveless position won by the machine if
true and lost if false.1 The machine’s move n can thus be seen as claiming that n is the
value of f(m). Now it must be clear that ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
represents the problem of
computing f , with the machine having an algorithmic winning strategy for this game
iff f is a computable function. Similarly, where S is a set,⊓x(x ∈ S⊔x 6∈ S) represents
the problem of deciding S: here, again, the first move is by the environment, consisting
in choosing a value m for x (asking “is m an element of S?”); and the next step is by
the machine who, in order to win, should choose the true disjunct of m ∈ S ⊔m 6∈ S,
i.e. correctly tell whether m is an element of S or not.
Next, ◦– is an operation of reducing one problem to another in the weakest pos-
sible — and hence most natural — sense, for which reason [6] calls it weak reduction,2
as opposed to strong (strict, linear) reduction denoted in CL by the different symbol
→. As a reduction operation, ◦– induces — and in certain contexts can be identi-
fied with — a reducibility relation. Specifically, a problem B is weakly reducible to a
problem A iff the problem A ◦–B has an algorithmic solution. Intuitively, A ◦–B is a
problem solving which means solving B while having A as an external computational
resource, with an “external computational resource” meaning a to-be-solved-by-the-
environment computational problem. More precisely, in the antecedent the roles of the
problem-solving machine and its environment are interchanged. Acting in the role of
an environment there, the machine may observe how the antecedent is being solved,
and utilize this information in its own solving the consequent.
An example might help. Let T be a finitely axiomatized applied theory based on
classical first-order logic, such as, say, Robinson’s arithmetic, and let x range over the
formulas of the language of T . Next, let PrT (x) be the predicate “x is a theorem of
T ”, Pr(x) the predicate “x is provable in classical predicate calculus”, and ¬PrT (x)
and ¬Pr(x) the ordinary negations of these predicates. As a decision problem, the
T -theoremhood problem would be expressed by ⊓x
(
PrT (x) ⊔ ¬PrT (x)
)
. This is gen-
erally undecidable, yet algorithmically reducible to the problem ⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
of provability in predicate calculus. The problem of reducing the former to the latter
can then be expressed by
⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
◦– ⊓x
(
PrT (x) ⊔ ¬PrT (x)
)
. (1)
The duty of a machine solving the above compound problem is to solve ⊓x
(
PrT (x) ⊔
¬PrT (x)
)
, i.e. answer any given question of the type “is F a theorem of T?” asked by
the environment. Yet, the machine is expected to do so only on the condition that the
environment does not fail to correctly solve the similar problem ⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
1This should not suggest that the atoms of intuitionistic logic are required to be interpreted as
moveless games/positions. Rather, they represent arbitrary interactive computational problems.
2The symbol used for ◦- in [6] was ⇒.
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in the antecedent, where the roles are switched and it is the machine who can ask ques-
tions like “is H provable in predicate calculus?”. So, here is an algorithmic strategy for
the machine. Wait until the environment asks “is F a theorem of T?” for some par-
ticular F . Then ask the counterquestion “is Ax→ F provable in predicate calculus?”,
where Ax is the conjunction of all nonlogical axioms of T . The environment will have
to provide a correct yes/no answer, or else it loses. Whatever the answer of the envi-
ronment in the antecedent is, repeat the same answer in the consequent, and rest your
case. A success of this strategy is guaranteed by the deduction theorem for classical
logic.
Observe that the above explanation of the meaning of A ◦–B is exactly what the
Turing reduction of B to A is all about. The latter — more precisely, the Turing
reducibility of B to A — is defined as existence of a Turing machine that solves B
when having an oracle correctly answering any questions regarding A. We can see such
an oracle as (a part of) the environment solving A for the machine, thus providing
an external computational resource. The only difference is that the resource provided
by an oracle is always a simple question-answering type of a task such as the above
⊓x
(
Pr(x) ⊔ ¬Pr(x)
)
, while the antecedent (as well as the consequent, of course) of
a ◦– -implication can have an arbitrarily complex interaction interface. For instance,
(1) is already a problem with a non-standard interface, and CL, unlike traditional
approaches, allows us to meaningfully talk about reducing (1) itself to yet another
problem, or reducing another problem to it. As a reducibility relation, ◦– is thus
a conservative generalization of the kind old textbook concept of Turing reducibility
from the traditional, input/output sorts of problems to problems of arbitrary degrees
of interactivity.
A relevant question here is whether the antecedent, as a resource, is allowed to
be reused. The answer is yes. Turing reduction does not impose any limits on how
many times the oracle can be queried. Similarly, if our strategy for (1) had a need to
repeatedly ask “is H provable in predicate calculus?” (for various Hs), it would have
been able to do so. This essentially means that multiple copies rather than a single
copy of A are played in the antecedent of A ◦–B.
Computability logic, of course, does have a stronger reduction operation which for-
bids repeated usage of the antecedent. It is the already mentioned→. Not surprisingly,
the logical behavior of → is dramatically different from that of ◦– : informally speak-
ing, the former is (plainly) resource-sensitive while the latter is not. The following two
intuitionistic principles are examples of valid formulas that stop being valid if ◦– is
replaced by →:
P ⊓ (P ◦–Q) ◦–Q;(
P ◦– (Q ◦–R)
)
◦–
(
(P ◦–Q) ◦– (P ◦–R)
)
.
As for $, CL understands it as a computational problem of universal strength, i.e.
a problem to which any other problem of interest is algorithmically reducible. Turing
completeness, NP-completeness, etc. are good intuitive examples of “being of universal
strength”. Subsection 2.3 explains this concept in greater detail.
The present introductory section has been written for a general audience, but the
same cannot be said about the rest of the paper, which is largely meant only for those
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who are already sufficiently familiar with computability logic, or are willing to do some
parallel reading. While still very young, due to the dynamic development ([6]-[13]) since
its birth in 2003, CL has reached the point where it is no longer feasible or expedient
to define (let alone explain and motivate) all over again each of the already introduced
concepts relevant to a given technical paper. This article does rely, both technically and
motivationally, on some prior material. Specifically, the proofs presented here should
be read after or in parallel with the relevant parts of [10], which serves as a source of all
special notation, terminology and concepts for the present paper (call it an appendix
if you wish). While long, [10] is easy to read as it is written in a semitutorial style,
without assuming any preliminary knowledge of the subject. Every unfamiliar term or
notation used but not defined in the present paper can and should be looked up in [10],
which has a convenient index of all terms and symbols. Familiarity with or parallel
reading of [10] is a necessary and sufficient condition for understanding the technical
parts of this paper.
2 Intuitionistic logic
2.1 Syntax
The language of propositional intuitionistic logic Int has one logical atom $ and
infinitely many nonlogical atoms, for which we use the metavariables P , Q, R, X , Y ,
Z, T , W , possibly with indices. Its formulas, that will be referred to as Int-formulas,
are built from atoms and the binary operators ◦– , ⊔, ⊓ in the standard way. We will
be using the letters E,F,G,H,K3 (possibly with indices) as metavariables for formulas,
and underlined letters such as G as metavariables for finite sequences of formulas. The
meaning of an expression such as G,F,H should be clear: this is the result of appending
F to G, and then appending H to the resulting sequence.
An Int-sequent is a pair G ⇒ E, where G, called the antecedent, is any finite
sequence of Int-formulas, and E, called the succedent, is a (one single) Int-formula.
Below is a Gentzen-style axiomatization of Int. A formula K is considered provable
in it iff the empty-antecedent sequent ⇒ K is provable. We will be writing Int ⊢ for
provability in Int.
The axioms of Int are all Int-sequents of the form
K ⇒ K or $⇒ K,
and the rules of inference, with i ranging over {1, 2}, are given by the following
schemata:
3And sometimes some other capital letters as well, such as A,B, C,D, I.
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G,E, F,H ⇒ K
Exchange
G,F,E,H ⇒ K
G⇒ K
Weakening
G,E ⇒ K
G,E,E ⇒ K
Contraction
G,E ⇒ K
G,E ⇒ K
Right ◦–
G⇒ E ◦–K
G,E ⇒ K1 H ⇒ K2
Left ◦–
G,H,K2 ◦–E ⇒ K1
G⇒ Ki
Right ⊔
G⇒ K1 ⊔K2
G,E1 ⇒ K G,E2 ⇒ K
Left ⊔
G,E1 ⊔ E2 ⇒ K
G⇒ K1 G⇒ K2
Right ⊓
G⇒ K1 ⊓K2
G,Ei ⇒ K
Left ⊓
G,E1 ⊓ E2 ⇒ K
2.2 Kripke semantics
A Kripke model [15] — or simply a model — is a triple K = (W ,R, |≡ ), where:
• W (here) is the set {1, . . . , n} of the first n ≥ 1 positive integers, called the
worlds of K. 1 is said to be the root of K, and n is said to be the size of K.
• R, called the accessibility relation, is a transitive, reflexive and antisymmetric
relation between worlds, such that, for all p, q1, q2 ∈ W , the following conditions
are satisfied:
– 1Rp;
– whenever q1Rp and q2Rp, we have q1Rq2 or q2Rq1.
In other words, (W ,R) forms a tree with 1 at its root. When pRq, we say that
q is accessible (in K) from p.
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• |≡ , called the forcing relation of K, is a relation between worlds and Int-
formulas, for all p ∈ W and all formulas E,F satisfying the following conditions:
– if p |≡E and pRq, then q |≡E;
– p /|≡ $;
– p |≡E ⊔ F iff p |≡E or p |≡ F (or both);
– p |≡E ⊓ F iff p |≡E and p |≡ F ;
– p |≡E ◦– F iff, for every world q accessible from p, if q |≡E, then q |≡ F .
Where G is a sequence of formulas, we write p |≡G to mean that p |≡G for every
formula G of G. The relation |≡ further extends to sequents by stipulating that
p |≡G⇒ E iff, for every world q accessible from p, if q |≡G, then q |≡E. We read
p |≡ ς (whatever ς is) as “p forces ς (in K)”.
Let K = (W ,R, |≡ ) be a model. Where F is an Int-formula, or a sequence of
Int-formulas, or an Int-sequent, we write K||≡ F to mean that 1 |≡ F . Note that this
immediately implies that p |≡ F for all p ∈ W . And we say that an Int-formula E
is K-equivalent to an Int-formula F — symbolically K||≡E ◦–◦ F — iff K||≡E ◦– F
and K||≡F ◦–E. Obviously K||≡E ◦–◦ F means that, for each world p of K, p |≡E iff
p |≡F , so that “K does not see any difference between E and F”. Next, we will write
simply ||≡ F or ||≡E ◦–◦ F to mean that K||≡F or K||≡E ◦–◦ F for every Kripke model
K. The symbols /|≡ and /||≡ , as expected, will be used for the negations of |≡ and ||≡ ,
respectively.
The following lemma is obvious:
Lemma 2.1 Assume K is a Kripke model, and E1, E2, G1, G2 are Int-formulas such
that:
• E2 is the result of replacing in E1 some occurrence(s) of G1 by G2;
• K||≡G1 ◦–◦G2.
Then K||≡E1 ◦–◦E2.
The following well known ([15]) fact will play an important role in our proof of
the completeness of Int with respect to the semantics of computability logic. We will
be referring to it as the soundness and completeness of Int with respect to Kripke
semantics:
Fact 2.2 An Int-sequent or Int-formula S is provable in Int if (completeness) and
only if (soundness) ||≡ S.
10
2.3 Computability-logic semantics
If the logical vocabulary of Int did not include $, this subsection would be redundant,
as the reader is assumed to be already familiar, from Sections 7 and 8 of [10], with
the CL semantics for a much more expressive language. However, $ was not officially
present in that language, so we need to clarify how the semantics of CL extends to the
$-containing formalism of Int. As a logical constant, $ was introduced in the very first
paper [6] on computability logic, but since it has been promised that [10] would be the
only external source on which the present paper relies, here we reproduce all necessary
definitions and some discussions from [6] pertaining to how $ is treated in CL.
To understand the intuitions underlying our interpretation of $, let us, for a moment,
imagine classical logic with its ⊥ written as $, and ¬E understood as an abbreviation
of E → $. How could one characterize $ in philosophical terms? The standard answer
here is that $ is an always false formula. Yet, there would be nothing in an axioma-
tization of the above version of classical logic directly implying that $ cannot be true.
Indeed, the (essentially) only postulated or derived scheme characterizing $ would be
$→ E for all formulas E. If, however, every nonlogical atom is interpreted as a true
proposition, then $→ E remains true even when $ is true. Thus, a more general char-
acterization of $ would be that it represents a “strongest” — rather than necessarily
false — proposition, i.e. a proposition that implies every other proposition expressible
in the language. Still, interpretations where all atoms and hence all formulas are true
would be rather pathological in the context of classical logic, and hardly of any interest.
Indeed, when everything we can say is true, there is no need for a logic at all. So, the
standard interpretation of $ as ⊥ (“always false formula”) in classical logic is a natural
choice essentially yielding no loss of generality even under the cautious philosophical
vision ‘$ = strongest proposition’. For, as long as there is at least one false statement
expressible in the language — and in all reasonable applications there indeed would be
such statements — being a strongest proposition automatically means being false, i.e.
being ⊥.
Things are quite different in computability logic though. It is more general than
classical logic, and one should expect that $, as a “strongest formula”, would also
naturally call for a more general or liberal interpretation than classical logic does. In
computability logic, as we know, formulas stand for computational problems rather
than just true/false statements, and |= A → B means that B is (algorithmically) re-
ducible to A rather than just that B is “implied” by A. So, $ here becomes a “strongest
problem”, i.e. a problem to which every other problem of interest is reducible. Let
us call such a problem a universal problem. Sure ⊥ is one — the simplest — sort of
a universal problem: everything is trivially reducible to it. But ⊥ is a very special
sort of a universal problem, and by far not the only meaningful interpretation for $.
What makes ⊥ special is that it is an elementary problem, while all other atoms of
Int generally represent problems of arbitrary degrees of interactivity — static games
of arbitrary depths, that is. Insisting on interpreting $ as an elementary problem (or
anything equivalent to such) while all other atoms and hence all other formulas rep-
resent not-necessarily-elementary problems might create an unnatural hybrid, possibly
giving rise to some logical anomalies and disharmony.
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Another feature that makes ⊥ less than general enough as the only legitimate
logical representative of universal problems is that ⊥ is what [6] (Section 18) calls
negative, while two other equally meaningful possibilities for a universal problem are
to be positive or indetermined. Informally speaking, a positive problem is one that
has a solution yet not necessarily an algorithmic one; a negative problem is one whose
negation is positive; and an indetermined problem is one that is neither positive nor
negative.4 Let us set aside indeterminism and focus on positiveness, here seeing it as
a computability-logic counterpart of classical truth. As noted earlier, in the context of
classical logic, dealing with an interpretation of the language that makes all formulas
true/positive would be less than interesting. The same, however, is far from being the
case for computability-logic-based applied languages. Considering languages — more
precisely, interpretations — that only allow us to express positive problems does make
perfect sense, and in no way does it generally make logic worthless or trivial. For
example, note that the standard computability or complexity theories are exclusively
concerned with positive problems. In fact, positiveness is inherent to the traditional,
narrow understanding of the term “problem”: in that understanding, a problem usually
means a game of the form ⊓x
(
A(x) ⊔ ¬A(x)
)
or ⊓x⊔y
(
y = f(x)
)
, where A is a
predicate and f is a function. Such problems are automatically positive: they do
have solutions, even though not always algorithmic or efficient ones. If, say, CL was
used to formalize a fragment of computability theory that is focused on recursively
enumerable problems (in our terms, games of the form ⊓x
(
A(x) ⊔ ¬A(x)
)
where A
is a recursively enumerable predicate), with the nonlogical general atoms thus ranging
over such problems, then one of the interesting — more so than ⊥ — interpretations
of $ would be understanding it as the acceptance problem for the universal Turing
machine (UTM). Intuitively, the reason why this positive problem is universal is that,
if I know what inputs UTM accepts and what inputs it does not accept, then, for
any recursively enumerable predicate A(x) and any particular value m for x, I can
effectively tell whether A(m) is true or false. Going a little bit beyond the present
scope of computability logic and imagining that → means polynomial-time reduction
(in a yet-to-be defined precise sense), if one is exclusively concerned with problems
from the class NP, then a natural candidate for a universal problem $ would be the
3-satisfiability or any other NP-complete problem — or, for safety, let us say some
polynomially-bounded version of the branching or parallel recurrence of such a problem.
Then |= E → $ would mean that E (too) is NP-complete, rather than that E is a “false”
or “unsolvable even by God” problem, i.e. that E is a problem which the traditional
complexity theory would not really consider meaningful and legitimate.
To summarize, the approach of computability logic, for adopting which it has good
reasons, is to interpret $ as a universal problem, i.e. a problem of universal strength,
i.e. a problem to which all other problems are reducible (in the sense of Section 6
of [10]). This approach insists on making no additional assumptions regarding $ as a
universal problem, such as its being elementary, or negative, or non-positive, etc.
Of course, the above is only a philosophical characterization, and what, exactly, a
universal problem means is yet to be formally defined. First of all, the range of “all” in
4Yes, indetermined problems do exists, although, according to Theorem 18.7 of [6], not among
perifinite-depth ones.
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“all other problems” should be specified. Otherwise, ⊥ would always be among “other
problems”, which would make ⊥ (modulo equivalence) the only possible candidate for a
universal problem. That is, the concept of universal problem is relative — relative to a
set of problems, called the problem universe, that are considered the only “legitimate”,
or “of interest” problems within a given treatment. We reasonably require any problem
universe to be countable, and come in the form of a fixed list of its elements rather
than just as the set of those elements. For simplicity we also require that such a list
be infinite. There is no loss of generality here, because any finite list can be painlessly
extended to an “essentially the same” yet formally infinite list by replicating its last
element infinitely many times. Here comes the formal definition:
Definition 2.3 A problem universe is an infinite sequence U = 〈A1, A2, A3, . . .〉 of
static games. A universal problem of such a U is any static game B satisfying the
following conditions:
1. For each i ≥ 1, Ai is reducible (in the sense of Section 6 of [10]) to B and,
2. furthermore, there is an effective procedure that, for each i ≥ 1, constructs a
reduction (in the sense of Section 6 of [10]) of Ai to B.
As noted, the intuition behind the concept of universal problem B is that this is
a problem of universal strength: having it as a computational resource means being
able to solve any of the problems of the universe, as every problem of the universe is
algorithmically reducible to B. However, just existence of those algorithmic reductions
would have little value if there was no way to find them. The ‘furthermore’ clause of
the above definition guarantees that reduction strategies not only exist, but can be
effectively found. Of course, when the problem universe is “essentially finite”, that
clause is redundant.
There are many potential problem universes, and the next question to clarify is
which one should be considered the problem universe U in any given case, i.e. in any
particular application of Int or CL in general. In precise terms, a particular application
is nothing but the particular, “actual” interpretation ∗ chosen for the language — the
function that sends every formula F to the computational problem F ∗ represented
by F . An answer comes very naturally. The nonlogical atoms of Int represent the
computational problems of interest in a given application, so the interpretation P ∗ of
each such atom P should be in U . And, since there is no shortage of such atoms,
we may assume that vice versa is also always true: every element of U is P ∗ for some
nonlogical atom P . The order in which the elements of U are arranged is just a typically
irrelevant technicality, and among the natural arrangements is the one determined by
the lexicographic order of the P s. So, U = 〈P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , P
∗
3 , . . .〉, where P1, P2, P3, . . . is
the lexicographic list of all nonlogical atoms, presents itself as a natural choice for the
problem universe for any given application— interpretation ∗, that is — of the language
of Int. An alternative approach would be to stipulate that U = 〈F ∗1 , F
∗
2 , F
∗
3 , . . .〉, where
F1, F2, F3, . . . is the lexicographic list of all Int-formulas rather than just nonlogical
atoms. But this technical alternative is not worth considering. It follows from the later-
proven Lemma 4.1 that every universal problem of 〈P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , P
∗
3 , . . .〉 is automatically
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also a universal problem of 〈F ∗1 , F
∗
2 , F
∗
3 , . . .〉 and vice versa. This means that the two
approaches would be the same in every reasonable sense.
The agreed-on problem universe U = 〈P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , P
∗
3 , . . .〉 would, however, have many
universal problems, and the next question to ask is which one should count as the
universal problem $∗ of U . Our answer is:
$ can be interpreted as any — up to equivalence — universal problem of U. (2)
Let us clarify this. Why “any” is obvious: depending on needs or taste, different
universal problems of U can be chosen to be treated as “the” universal problem. In
most typical cases the universal problem would be an element of the problem universe
or equivalent to such, even though Definition 2.3 does not insist on this. Going back
to our earlier examples, as the universal problem of the corresponding universe, one
could have chosen the halting problem instead of the acceptance problem for the UTM;
or, alternatively, the strictly stronger problem of arithmetical truth could have been
chosen, i.e. the problem ⊓x
(
True(x) ⊔ ¬True(x)
)
, where True(x) is the predicate
“x is the Go¨del number of a true arithmetical sentence”. And, in the complexity
theory example, the Hamiltonian path problem could have been chosen instead of 3-
satisfiability; or, alternatively, there could have been reasons to choose some PSPACE-
complete problem as the universal problem instead of an NP-complete problem.
As for “up to equivalence”, it indicates the somewhat relaxed meaning of “any” in
(2) and our subsequent discussion of it. What (2) says, in precise terms, is that, for any
universal problem B of U , $ is always allowed to be interpreted as a certain problem
which is equivalent (in the sense of Section 6 of [10]) to B, but not necessarily equal to
B in the literal sense. Specifically, CL limits the officially admissible interpretations
of $ to what is calls standard universal problems of U . As will be argued shortly, such
a limitation is harmless, yielding no loss of generality or loss of potential applicability
of Int. Briefly, this is so because, as it turns out, every universal problem of U is
equivalent to some standard universal problem of U , with standard universal problems
thus representing the equivalence classes of all possible universal problems (serving
as “standard representatives” of those equivalence classes). But let us see the formal
definitions first.
Definition 2.4 Let U = 〈A2, A3, A4, . . .〉 be a problem universe.
1. For a problem A1, the A1-based standard universal problem of U is the
problem B defined as follows:
• LrBe = {〈〉} ∪ {〈⊥i,Γ〉 | i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, . . .}, Γ ∈ Lr
Ai
e }.
• WnBe 〈〉 = ⊤; Wn
B
e 〈⊥i,Γ〉 =Wn
Ai
e 〈Γ〉.
2. A standard universal problem B of U is the A1-based standard universal
problem of U for some problem A1; the latter is said to be the base of B.
Notice that the A1-based standard universal problem of U = 〈A2, A3, A4, . . .〉 is
nothing but the infinite choice conjunction
B = A1 ⊓ A2 ⊓A3 ⊓ A4 ⊓ . . . .
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It is also easy to see that such a B is indeed a universal problem of U . A strategy that
wins B → Ai for any Ai ∈ U is to select the conjunct Ai of the infinite conjunction B
thus bringing the game down to Ai → Ai, and then continue the rest of the play using
the standard copy-cat methods (namely, the strategy CCS defined in Section 4).
Definition 2.5 An interpretation is a function that sends every atom Q of the
language of Int to a static game Q∗ such that, where P1, P2, . . . is the lexicographic list
of all nonlogical atoms, $∗ is a standard universal problem of the universe 〈P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , . . .〉.
This function extends to compound Int-formulas by stipulating that:
(E ◦– F )∗ = E∗ ◦–F ∗;
(E ⊔ F )∗ = E∗ ⊔ F ∗;
(E ⊓ F )∗ = E∗ ⊓ F ∗.
Next, as in [10], an Int-formula E is said to be:
• valid iff, for every interpretation ∗, |= E∗;
• uniformly valid iff there is an EPM or HPM M, called a uniform solution
for E, such that, for every interpretation ∗, M |= E∗.
As in [10], ⊢⊢E is a symbolic way to say that E is valid, ⊢⊢E means that E is uniformly
valid, and M⊢⊢E means that M is a uniform solution for E.
It is clear that the promised completeness of Int with respect to the semantics of
CL (i.e. with respect to validity and/or uniform validity) would automatically remain
true under various — whatever — liberalizations of our definitions of the concepts of
universal problem and interpretation. But, in fact, this is so not only for complete-
ness. One can also show that Int would remain sound with respect to validity even
if Definition 2.3 did not have the ‘furthermore’ clause 2, and Definition 2.5 allowed $
to be interpreted as any (rather than necessarily standard) universal problem of the
universe 〈P ∗1 , P
∗
2 , . . .〉 or 〈F
∗
1 , F
∗
2 , . . .〉. The reason for our choosing the present, seem-
ingly unnecessarily capricious, definitions is to ensure the soundness of Int not only
with respect to validity, but with respect to uniform validity as well. Our choice does
achieve this highly desirable effect while, at the same time, sacrifices no generality or
applicability. The point is that when it comes to computability, equivalent problems
are “the same” in all relevant aspects and hence can be thought of as being identical.
Specifically, when A and A′ are equivalent, then A is computable if and only if A′ is
so, and any compound problem where A is a component (e.g. A ◦–C, C ⊔ (A ⊓ D),
etc.) is computable if and only if the result of replacing in it A with A′ is so. But, as
proven in [6] (Proposition 23.4), we have:
Any universal problem B of any given problem universe is equivalent to the
B-based standard universal problem B′ of the same universe.
So, whether $ is translated as the above B or B′ has no effect on the computability
status of the problems represented by formulas. Furthermore, one could show that
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there is an effective procedure for converting any solution of the problem represented
by an arbitrary formula F when $ is read as B into a solution of the problem represented
by the same formula when $ is read as B′, and vice versa. This makes the difference
between the two readings of $ negligible, and allows us to safely restrict our focus only
to the official interpretation of $ as B′, even if the universal problem of our original
and direct interest was B.
2.4 Main theorem
By a Σ1-predicate we mean a predicate that can be written as ∃zA for some de-
cidable finitary predicate (elementary game) A. And a Boolean combination of
Σ1-predicates is a ¬,∧,∨-combination of such games. We denote the set of all Boolean
combinations of Σ1-predicates by
ΣB1 .
Next, we let
⊔ΣB1
stand for the set of all games of the form ⊔xA, where A ∈ ΣB1 .
Next, let ∗ be an interpretation and C a set of static games, such as ΣB1 or ⊔ΣB1 .
We say that ∗ is of complexity C iff the following two conditions are satisfied:
• for every nonlogical atom P , P ∗ is in C;
• the base of $∗ is also in C.
Theorem 2.6 For any Int-formula K, Int ⊢ K iff ⊢⊢K iff ⊢⊢K. Furthermore:
(a) There is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary Int-proof of an arbitrary
formula K and constructs a uniform solution for K.
(b) If an Int-formula K is not provable in Int, then K∗ is not computable for some
interpretation ∗ of complexity ⊔ΣB1 .
The soundness part of this theorem in the strong sense of clause (a) will be proven
in Section 4. And a proof of the completeness part in the strong sense of clause (b)
will be given in Sections 6 through 10.
3 Affine logic
The present paper is only concerned with intuitionistic logic. Yet we need to take a
close and fresh look at the more expressive (even though not deductively stronger)
affine logic, because it is going to be a heavily exploited tool in our soundness and
completeness proof for Int.
16
3.1 Syntax and computability-logic semantics
The language of what we in this paper refer to as affine logic (Al) has the same set of
atoms as the language of Int, that is, infinitely many nonlogical atoms plus one logical
atom $. Its connectives are the unary ¬,◦| ,◦
| and the variable-arity — n-ary for each
n ≥ 2 — operators ∨,∧,⊔,⊓. In the formulas of this language, to which we refer as
Al-formulas, the operators → and ◦– are understood as abbreviations, defined by
• E → F = ¬E ∨ F ;
• E ◦–F = ◦|E → F .
Also, when applied to nonatomic formulas, ¬ is understood as an abbreviation defined
by:
• ¬¬E = E;
• ¬◦|E = ◦
|¬E;
• ¬◦
|E = ◦|¬E;
• ¬(E1 ∨ . . . ∨ En) = ¬E1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬En;
• ¬(E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En) = ¬E1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬En;
• ¬(E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ En) = ¬E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ ¬En;
• ¬(E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En) = ¬E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬En.
We continue to use X , Y , Z, T , P , Q, R, W as metavariables for nonlogical atoms,
E, F , G, H , K for formulas, and G, H for finite sequences of formulas. We will also
be underlining complex expressions, as in ◦|G. The latter should be understood as a
sequence ◦|G1, . . . , ◦|Gn of ◦| -prefixed formulas.
The definition of an interpretation for the language of Al is literally the same as
that for the language of Int given in Subsection 2.3, and any interpretation ∗ extends
to compound Al-formulas in the same way as in the case of Int-formulas, commuting
with all connectives seen as the same-name game operations. That is, (¬E)∗ = ¬E∗,
(◦
|E)∗ = ◦
|E∗, (E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En)∗ = E∗1 ∧ . . . ∧ E
∗
n, etc. Next, the definitions of validity
(⊢⊢), uniform validity (⊢⊢) and uniform solution (M⊢⊢) for Int-formulas verbatim
extend to all Al-formulas.
Based on what we know from [10], when it comes to interpretations, it makes
virtually no difference whether →, ◦– and ¬ (the latter when applied to compound
formulas) are understood as primitives or just as abbreviations. This is so because,
either by definition or as easily derived facts, for any games A,B,. . . we have A→ B =
¬A ∨B, A ◦–B = ◦|A→ B, ¬¬A = A, ¬(A ⊔B) = ¬A ⊓ ¬B, etc. Hence, we can and
will safely think of the (officially ◦– -containing) language of Int as a sublanguage of
the language of Al, with all Int-formulas thus automatically being also Al-formulas.
An Al-sequent is any finite sequence of Al-formulas. Thus, unlike the case with
Int where sequents were two-sided, in (the axiomatization of) Al we choose one-sided
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sequents. Below is a Gentzen-style axiomatization of Al. As always, a formula E is
considered provable iff E, as a one-formula sequent, is so. The symbol Al ⊢ will be
used for Al-provability, whether it be for sequents or formulas.
The axioms of Al are all Al-sequents of the form
¬E,E,
and the rules of inference are given by the following schemata, where n ≥ 2 and
1 ≤ i ≤ n:
G,E, F,H
Exchange
G,F,E,H
G
Weakening
G,E
G, ◦|E, ◦|E
◦
| -Contraction
G, ◦|E
G,Ei
⊔-Introduction
G,E1 ⊔ . . . ⊔En
G,E1 . . . G,En
⊓-Introduction
G,E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓En
G,E1, . . . , En
∨-Introduction
G,E1 ∨ . . . ∨En
G1, E1 . . . Gn, En
∧-Introduction
G1, . . . , Gn, E1 ∧ . . . ∧En
G,E
◦
| -Introduction
G, ◦|E
◦
|G,E
◦
| -Introduction
◦
|G, ◦
|E
The above formulation of Al can be called strict. We will, however, usually prefer
to work with the equivalent relaxed version of Al, in which sequents are seen as
multisets rather than sequences of formulas. This eliminates the annoying need for
explicitly referring to one or several obvious steps of applying the exchange rule.
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Seeing $ as an ordinary — nonlogical — atom, syntactically there is no difference
between Al and the propositional, unit-free fragment of Girard’s [4] affine logic. There-
fore, in view of known syntactic results for the latter, Al is closed under the following
two rules:
G,E ¬E,H
Cut
G,H
E E → F
Modus ponens
F
Fact 3.1 (The soundness of Al:) If Al ⊢ K, then ⊢⊢K and hence ⊢⊢K (any Al-
formula K).
Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary Al-proof of an
arbitrary Al-formula K and constructs a uniform solution for K.
Proof. Remember logic AL from Section 11 of [10]. If we think of $ as an
ordinary (nonlogical) atom, the language of Al is just a fragment of the language of
AL. Furthermore, as the two systems are analytical, AL is a conservative extension
of Al: the fact that $ counts as a logical atom in Al while it is seen as a nonlogical
atom in AL, of course, is irrelevant, as there are no special rules for $ in Al. The
special treatment of $ in Al only shows itself in semantics. Specifically, ignoring the
here irrelevant difference that the language of Al is propositional while that of AL is
not, the set of functions that we now call interpretations is a proper subset of the set
of functions called interpretations in [10]. With a moment’s thought this can be seen
to mean that the concepts of validity, uniform validity or uniform solution in the sense
of [10] are stronger than the same concepts in our present sense. For this reason, Fact
3.1 immediately follows from the theorem of Section 11 of [10], which says about AL
the same as what Fact 3.1 says about Al. ✷
In concordance with the notational conventions of [10], in what follows {EPMs}
stands for the set of all EPMs.
Fact 3.2 For any Al-formulas E,F and any interpretation ∗, we have:
a) if |= E∗ and |= E∗ → F ∗, then |= F ∗;
b) if ⊢⊢E and ⊢⊢E → F , then ⊢⊢F .
Furthermore, there is an effective function f : {EPMs}×{EPMs} −→ {EPMs} such
that, for any Al-formulas E,F , interpretation ∗ and EPMs E , C, we have:
a) if E |= E∗ and C |= E∗ → F ∗, then f(E , C) |= F ∗;
b) if E⊢⊢E and C⊢⊢E → F , then f(E , C)⊢⊢F .
Proof. According to the theorem of Section 10 of [10], computability is closed
under modus ponens, in the constructive sense that there is an effective function f that
converts any solutions of arbitrary games A and A→ B into a solution of B, as long as
A and B are static. Of course, such a function f (also) works exactly as clause (a) of
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the present fact states, for E∗ and F ∗ are always static games. And, with a moment’s
thought, clause (b) can be seen to be an immediate corollary of clause (a). ✷
Fact 3.3 For any Al-formula E and any interpretation ∗, we have:
a) if |= E∗, then |= ◦
|E∗;
b) if ⊢⊢E, then ⊢⊢◦
|E.
Furthermore, there is an effective function h : {EPMs} −→ {EPMs} such that, for any
Al-formula E, interpretation ∗ and EPM E, we have:
a) if E |= E∗, then h(E) |= ◦
|E∗;
b) if E⊢⊢E, then h(E)⊢⊢◦
|E∗.
Proof. According to one of the lemmas of Section 13 of [10], computability is
closed under the rule “from A to ◦
|A” in the constructive sense that there is an effective
function h that converts any solution of an arbitrary static game A into a solution of
◦
|A. As in the proof of Fact 3.2, such a function h can be seen to (also) work exactly as
the above clause (a) states. And, again, clause (b) is an immediate corollary of clause
(a). ✷
3.2 The replacement lemma
An occurrence O of a subformula in a given Al-formula is said to be positive iff it is
not in the scope of ¬. An occurrence of a nonatomic formula would thus always be
positive, because officially ¬ cannot be applied to such a formula.
Lemma 3.4 Let G1, G2, H1, H2 be Al-formulas such that H2 is the result of replacing
in H1 a certain positive occurrence of G1 by G2. Then Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma are satisfied. Let O be the occurrence
of G1 in H1 under question. Our proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of H1
—more precisely, the complexity of H1 minus the complexity of G1, for the complexity
of the G1 part of H1 is irrelevant. We will be working with the relaxed version of Al.
Case 1: H1 = G1. Then H2 = G2, and thus what we need to show is that Al proves
◦
| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬G1, G2. But indeed, this sequent follows from G1 ∧ ¬G2,¬G1, G2 by
◦
| -introduction, and the latter, in turn, follows from the axioms G1,¬G1 and ¬G2, G2
by ∧-introduction.
Case 2: H1 = ◦
|E1, and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence O
′ of G1
in E1. Let E2 be the result of replacing in E1 the occurrence O
′ by G2. We thus have
H2 = ◦
|E2. By the induction hypothesis,Al ⊢ ◦| (G1∧¬G2),¬E1, E2. From here, by first
applying ∨-introduction and then ◦
| -introduction, we getAl ⊢ ◦| (G1∧¬G2), ◦
| (¬E1∨E2),
i.e.
Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ¬◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2). (3)
Next, we have:
1. Al ⊢ E1 ∧ ¬E2, ¬E1, E2 (from axioms E1,¬E1 and ¬E2, E2 by ∧-introduction)
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2. Al ⊢ ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ◦|¬E1, E2 (from 1 by ◦| -introduction applied twice)
3. Al ⊢ ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ◦|¬E1, ◦
|E2 (from 2 by ◦
| -introduction)
4. Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ◦|¬E1, ◦
|E2 (from (3) and 3 by cut)
Now, the desired Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2 is nothing but an abbreviation of 4.
Case 3: H1 = ◦|E1, and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence O′ of G1
in E1. This case is symmetric to the previous one. Let E2 be the result of replacing
in E1 the occurrence O
′ by G2. We thus have H2 = ◦|E2. For the same reasons as in
Case 2, the provability (3) holds. Next, we have:
1. Al ⊢ E1 ∧ ¬E2, ¬E1, E2 (from axioms E1,¬E1 and ¬E2, E2 by ∧-introduction)
2. Al ⊢ ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ¬E1, ◦|E2 (from 1 by ◦| -introduction applied twice)
3. Al ⊢ ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ◦
|¬E1, ◦|E2 (from 2 by ◦
| -introduction)
4. Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ◦
|¬E1, ◦|E2 (from (3) and 3 by cut)
Now, the desired Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2 is nothing but an abbreviation of 4.
Case 4: H1 = E
1
1∧. . .∧E
n
1 , and the occurrence O of G1 inH1 is the occurrenceO
′ of
G1 in E
i
1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let E
i
2 be the result of replacing in E
i
1 the occurrence O
′ by G2;
for any other (6= i) number j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let Ej2 = E
j
1 . Thus, H2 = E
1
2 ∧ . . . ∧E
n
2 .
By the induction hypothesis, Al ⊢ ◦| (G1∧¬G2),¬Ei1, E
i
2. From here, by ∨-introduction
and ◦
| -introduction, we get
Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ◦
| (¬Ei1 ∨ E
i
2),
i.e.
Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ¬◦| (E
i
1 ∧ ¬E
i
2). (4)
Next, we have:
1. Al ⊢ ¬Ei2, E
i
2 (axiom)
2. Al ⊢ ¬Ej1 , E
j
2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n} (axiom, because E
j
1 = E
j
2)
3. Al ⊢ ¬E11 , . . . , ¬E
i−1
1 , ¬E
i
2, ¬E
i+1
1 , . . . , ¬E
n
1 , E
1
2 ∧ . . . ∧ E
n
2
(from 1 and 2 by ∧-introduction)
4. Al ⊢ Ei1, ¬E
i
1 (axiom)
5. Al ⊢ Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2, ¬E
1
1 , . . . , ¬E
n
1 , E
1
2 ∧ . . . ∧ E
n
2 (from 3 and 4 by ∧-introduction)
6. Al ⊢ ◦| (Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2), ¬E
1
1 , . . . , ¬E
n
1 , E
1
2 ∧ . . . ∧ E
n
2 (from 5 by
◦
| -introduction)
7. Al ⊢ ◦| (Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2), ¬E
1
1 ∨ . . . ∨ ¬E
n
1 , E
1
2 ∧ . . . ∧ E
n
2 (from 6 by ∨-introduction)
Now, 7 can be rewritten as Al ⊢ ◦| (Ei1 ∧¬E
i
2),¬H1, H2. This, together with (4), by
cut, implies the desired Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2.
Case 5: H1 = E
1
1 ∨ . . .∨E
n
1 . This case symmetric to the previous one, and we leave
details to the reader.
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Case 6: H1 = E
1
1⊓. . .⊓E
n
1 , and the occurrence O of G1 inH1 is the occurrenceO
′ of
G1 in E
i
1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let E
i
2 be the result of replacing in E
i
1 the occurrence O
′ by G2;
for any other (6= i) number j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let Ej2 = E
j
1 . Thus, H2 = E
1
2 ⊓ . . . ⊓E
n
2 .
Reasoning as we did in Case 4, we again find that (4) holds. Next, we have:
1. Al ⊢ Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2, ¬E
i
1, E
i
2 (from axioms E
i
1,¬E
i
1 and ¬E
i
2, E
i
2 by ∧-introduction)
2. Al ⊢ Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2, ¬E
1
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬E
n
1 , E
i
2 (from 1 by ⊔-introduction)
3. Al ⊢ ¬Ej1 , E
j
2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n} (axiom, because E
j
1 = E
j
2)
4. Al ⊢ Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2, ¬E
j
1 , E
j
2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n}
(from 3 by weakening)
5. Al ⊢ Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2, ¬E
1
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬E
n
1 , E
j
2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , n}
(from 4 by ⊔-introduction)
6. Al ⊢ Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2, ¬E
1
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬E
n
1 , E
1
2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ E
n
2
(from 2 and 5 by ⊓-introduction)
7. Al ⊢ ◦| (Ei1 ∧ ¬E
i
2), ¬E
1
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ ¬E
n
1 , E
1
2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ E
n
2 (from 6 by
◦
| -introduction)
Now, 7 can be rewritten as Al ⊢ ◦| (Ei1 ∧¬E
i
2),¬H1, H2. From here and (4), by cut,
we infer the desired Al ⊢ ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2.
Case 7: H1 = E
1
1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ E
n
1 . Symmetric to the previous case, with details left to
the reader. ✷
Lemma 3.5 Let G1, G2, H1, H2 be Al-formulas, E, C be EPMs, and
∗ be an inter-
pretation such that the following three conditions are satisfied:
1. H2 is the result of replacing in H1 a certain positive occurrence of G1 by G2;
2. E |= H∗1 (resp. E⊢⊢H1);
3. C |= G∗1 → G
∗
2 (resp. C⊢⊢G1 → G2).
Then there is an EPM D with D |= H∗2 (resp. D⊢⊢H2).
Furthermore, there is a (∗-independent) effective procedure that constructs such an
EPM D from arbitrary G1, G2, H1, H2, E, C.
Proof. Assume all of the conditions of the lemma are satisfied. Let f and h
be the functions whose existence is stated in Facts 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. By Fact
3.3, the assumption C |= G∗1 → G
∗
2 (resp. C⊢⊢G1 → G2) implies h(C) |= ◦
| (G∗1 → G
∗
2)
(resp. h(C)⊢⊢◦
| (G1 → G2)). Next, by Lemma 3.4, there is an Al-proof of ◦| (G1 ∧
¬G2),¬H1, H2 and hence — applying ∨-introduction twice and abbreviating the result
— an Al-proof of ◦
| (G1 → G2) → (H1 → H2). Of course, such a proof can be found
effectively.5 Therefore, in view of Fact 3.1, we can effectively construct an EPM B with
5After all,Al is recursively enumerable, let alone that it is also known to be decidable. Alternatively,
a procedure constructing an Al-proof of ◦..
.
(G1 → G2) → (H1 → H2) can be directly extracted from
our proof of Lemma 3.4.
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B⊢⊢◦
| (G1 → G2) → (H1 → H2) and hence also with B |= ◦
| (G∗1 → G
∗
2) → (H
∗
1 → H
∗
2 ).
Then, by Fact 3.2, f(h(C),B) |= H∗1 → H
∗
2 (resp. f(h(C),B)⊢⊢H1 → H2). But, by
condition 2 of the present lemma, E |= H∗1 (resp. E⊢⊢H1). Hence, again by Fact
3.2, f(E , f(h(C),B)) |= H∗2 (resp. f(E , f(h(C),B))⊢⊢H2). Letting the sought D be
f(E , f(h(C),B)), we have just demonstrated how to construct D from G1, G2, H1, H2,
E , C. ✷
4 The soundness of intuitionistic logic
In this and some subsequent sections we will be constructing EPMs E with the claim
that E wins a certain game or a certain class of games. In our description of such an
E and further analysis of its behavior, we will be relying (usually implicitly) on the
clean environment assumption. According to it, the adversary of E never makes
moves that are illegal for the game(s) under question. As pointed out in [10], such
an assumption is perfectly safe and legitimate for, if the adversary makes an illegal
move, then E will be the winner no matter what happens afterwards, and making E
the winner is always the very purpose of our construction.
In some of our proofs we will employ a uniform EPM-solution for P → P called the
copy-cat strategy (CCS). This strategy consists in mimicking, in the antecedent, the
moves made by the environment in the consequent, and vice versa. More formally, the
algorithm that CCS follows is an infinite loop, in every iteration of which CCS keeps
granting permission until the environment makes a move 1.α (resp. 2.α), to which the
machine responds by the move 2.α (resp. 1.α). As shown in the proof of Proposition
22.1 of [6], this strategy is successful for every game of the form A→ A. An important
detail is that CCS never looks at the past history of the game, i.e. the movement of
its scanning head on the run tape is exclusively left-to-right. This means that, even if
the original game was something else and it only evolved to A→ A later as a result of
making a series of moves, switching to the CCS after the game has been brought down
to A→ A guarantees success no matter what happened in the past.
Lemma 4.1 For any Int-formula K, ⊢⊢$ → K. Furthermore, there is an effective
procedure that takes any Int-formula K and constructs a uniform solution E for $→ K.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of K, below we show how to construct
the above uniform solution E in the form of an EPM. Certain routine details of a
verification of the fact that E indeed always wins the game represented by $→ K will
be left to the reader. Some — arbitrary and largely irrelevant — interpretation ∗ will
be assumed to be fixed throughout most of our analysis of the work of E , even though,
in all but one case, it will be present only implicitly: by innocent abuse of terminology
and notation, we will not be distinguishing between a formula G and the game G∗
represented by it, and write G even when, strictly speaking, what is meant is G∗ rather
than G.
Case 1: K = $. Just let E = CCS.
Case 2: K is a nonlogical atom. Then, for some number m, K∗ should be conjunct
#m of the infinite ⊓-conjunction $∗ (note that m does not depend on ∗). We define
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E to be the EPM that acts as follows. At the beginning, it finds the above number
m and makes the move ‘1.m’, which can be seen to bring the game $ → K down to
K → K. After this move, E switches to (continues the rest of the play as) CCS.
Case 3: K is E ◦–F . Evidently Al ⊢ F → (E ◦–F ) and hence, by Fact 3.1, we
can construct an EPM A with A⊢⊢F → (E ◦–F ). By the induction hypothesis, we
also know how to construct and EPM C with C ⊢⊢$ → F . Now, Lemma 3.5 allows us
to combine A and C and construct the desired E with E⊢⊢$→ (E ◦– F ).
Case 4: K = E1 ⊔ E2. By the induction hypothesis, we know how to construct
an EPM C with C⊢⊢$ → E1. Now we define E to be the EPM that first makes the
move ‘2.1’, and then plays the rest of the game as C would play. E can be seen to be
successful because its initial move ‘2.1’ brings $→ K down to $→ E1.
Case 5: K = E1 ⊓ E2. By the induction hypothesis, two EPMs C1 and C2 can be
constructed with C1⊢⊢$ → E1 and C2⊢⊢$ → E2. We define E to be the EPM that acts
as follows. At the beginning, E keeps granting permission until the adversary makes a
move α. With the clean environment assumption in mind, α is ‘2.i’ for i = 1 or i = 2,
and it brings $ → E1 ⊓ E2 down to $ → Ei. If and after such a move α is made, E
continues the rest of the play as Ci. ✷
Lemma 4.2 For any Int-formula K, ⊢⊢◦
| $ → K. Furthermore, there is an effective
procedure that takes any Int-formula K and constructs a uniform solution for ◦
| $→ K.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, we can construct a uniform solution for ¬$ ∨K. At the
same time, evidently Al ⊢ ¬$ → ◦| ¬$ and hence, by Fact 3.1, we can also construct
a uniform solution for ¬$ → ◦|¬$. Now, Lemma 3.5 allows us to combine those two
uniform solutions and construct a uniform solution for ◦| ¬$ ∨K, i.e. for ◦
| $→ K. ✷
Lemma 4.3 There is an EPM E such that, for any Int-formulas E1 and E2, E is a
uniform solution for ◦|E1 ⊓ ◦|E2 → ◦| (E1 ⊓ E2).
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we will write a formula G to mean the
game G∗ for whatever (irrelevant) interpretation ∗. Here is a strategy that the sought
E can follow with a guaranteed success. Keep granting permission until the adversary
makes a (legal) move ‘2.ǫ.i’ (1 ≤ i ≤ 2). Such a move can be seen to bring the game
◦
|E1 ⊓ ◦|E2 → ◦| (E1 ⊓E2) down to ◦|E1 ⊓ ◦|E2 → ◦|Ei. Now make the move ‘1.i’, which
further brings the game down to ◦|Ei → ◦|Ei. Finally, switch to CCS. ✷
Remember that, in this paper, an underlined expression such as G, when occurring
in a sequent, stands for a sequence G1, . . . , Gn of formulas. We now further agree that,
when occurring as a subexpression within a formula, such an expression will be an
abbreviation of G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn. This subexpression will always occur within a “larger”
context such as G∧F or G→ F . Our convention is that, when n = 0, both G∧F and
G→ F simply mean F . And, of course, when n = 1, G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn is just G1.
Next, we agree to understand each Int-sequent G ⇒ K as — and identify with
— the Al-formula ◦
|G → K. Remember that where G = G1, . . . , Gn, ◦
|G means
◦
|G1, . . . , ◦
|Gn, and hence ◦
|G→ K means ◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|Gn → K.
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Now we are ready to prove the soundness part of Theorem 2.6. Consider an arbitrary
Int-sequent S with Int ⊢ S. By induction on the length of an Int-proof of S, we are
going to show that S, understood as a formula according to the above convention,
has a uniform solution E . This is sufficient to conclude that Int is ‘uniformly sound’.
Clause (a) of Theorem 2.6 also claims ‘constructive soundness’, i.e. that such an E
can be effectively built from a given Int-proof of S (at least, when S is an empty-
antecedent sequent). This claim of the theorem will be automatically taken care of by
the fact that our proof of the existence of E is constructive: all of the uniform-validity-
related lemmas on which we rely provide a way for actually constructing corresponding
uniform solutions. With this remark in mind and for the considerations of readability, in
what follows we only talk about uniform validity without explicitly mentioning uniform
solutions and without explicitly showing how to construct such solutions. Also, we no
longer use ⇒ or ◦– , seeing each sequent G ⇒ K as the formula ◦|G → K, and each
subformula E1 ◦–E2 of such a formula as ◦|E1 → E2.
There are 11 cases to consider, corresponding to the 11 possible rules (including
axioms as “rules” without premises) that might have been used at the last step of
an Int-derivation of S, with S being the conclusion of the rule. In each non-axiom
case below, “induction hypothesis” means the assumption that the premise(s) of the
corresponding rule is (are) uniformly valid. The goal in each case is to show that the
conclusion of the rule is also uniformly valid. In what follows, “soundness” should
be understood as Fact 3.1, and “modus ponens” as Fact 3.2. We will work with the
relaxed version of Al, treating Al-sequents as multisets rather than sets of formulas.
Axiom ◦
|K → K: Immediately from the obvious fact Al ⊢ ◦
|K → K by soundness.
Axiom ◦
| $→ K: Immediately from Lemma 4.2.
Exchange: It is easy to verify that Al proves
(◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E ∧ ◦
| F ∧ ◦
|H → K) → (◦
|G ∧ ◦
| F ∧ ◦
|E ∧ ◦
|H → K)
and hence, by soundness, this formula is uniformly valid. By the induction hypothesis,
so is its antecedent. Hence, by modus ponens, so is the consequent.
Weakening: Similar to the previous case, relying on the fact that, due to the
presence of weakening in Al, the latter proves (◦
|G→ K)→ (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E → K).
Contraction: Similar to the previous two cases, relying on the fact that, due to
the presence of ◦| -contraction, Al proves (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E ∧ ◦
|E → K)→ (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E → K).
Left ◦– : By the induction hypothesis, we have:
⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E → K1; (5)
⊢⊢◦
|H → K2. (6)
Our goal is to show that
⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
|H ∧ ◦
| (◦
|K2 → E)→ K1. (7)
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We claim that the following formula is provable in Al and hence, by soundness, is
uniformly valid:
(◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E → K1)→
(
◦
| (◦
|H → K2)→
(
◦
|G ∧ ◦
|H ∧ ◦
| (◦
|K2 → E)→ K1
))
. (8)
Below is an Al-proof of the above formula for the case when G = G and H = H
(both sequences are just one-formula sequences). Proofs for the cases when G and/or
H are longer or shorter, would take different numbers of steps, but otherwise would be
similar.
1. ¬K2, K2 (axiom)
2. ◦
|H, ◦| ¬H (axiom)
3. ◦
|H ∧ ¬K2, ◦| ¬H, K2 (from 2 and 1 by ∧-introduction)
4. ◦| (◦
|H ∧ ¬K2), ◦| ¬H, K2 (from 3 by ◦| -introduction)
5. ◦| (◦
|H ∧ ¬K2), ◦| ¬H, ◦
|K2 (from 4 by ◦
| -introduction)
6. E,¬E (axiom)
7. E, ◦| (◦
|H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬H, ◦
|K2 ∧ ¬E (from 5 and 6 by ∧-introduction)
8. E, ◦| (◦
|H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬H, ◦| (◦
|K2 ∧ ¬E) (from 7 by ◦| -introduction)
9. ◦
|E, ◦| (◦
|H ∧ ¬K2), ◦| ¬H, ◦| (◦
|K2 ∧ ¬E) (from 8 by ◦
| -introduction)
10. ◦
|G, ◦|¬G (axiom)
11. ◦
|G∧◦
|E, ◦| (◦
|H∧¬K2), ◦| ¬G, ◦|¬H, ◦| (◦
|K2∧¬E) (from 10 and 9 by ∧-introduction)
12. ¬K1, K1 (axiom)
13. (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E) ∧ ¬K1, ◦| (◦
|H ∧ ¬K2), ◦| ¬G, ◦| ¬H, ◦| (◦
|K2 ∧ ¬E), K1
(from 11 and 12 by ∧-introduction)
14.
(
(◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E) ∧ ¬K1
)
∨
(
◦
| (◦
|H ∧ ¬K2) ∨
(
(◦|¬G ∨ ◦| ¬H ∨ ◦| (◦
|K2 ∧ ¬E)) ∨K1
))
(from 13 by ∨-introduction applied several times)
Now, (8) is just an abbreviation of 14. By Fact 3.3, (6) implies ⊢⊢◦
| (◦
|H → K2).
From this, together with (5) and ⊢⊢(8), by modus ponens applied twice, we infer the
desired (7).
Right ◦– : It is easy to see that the following formula is provable in Al and hence,
by soundness, is uniformly valid:(
◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E → K
)
→
(
◦
|G→ (◦
|E → K)
)
.
And, by the induction hypothesis, ⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E → K. Applying modus ponens, we get
⊢⊢◦
|G→ (◦
|E → K).
Left ⊔: By the induction hypothesis, we have:
⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1 → K; (9)
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⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E2 → K. (10)
Our goal is to show that
⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
| (E1 ⊔E2)→ K. (11)
We claim that the following formula is provable in Al and hence, by soundness, is
uniformly valid:(
◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1 → K
)
→
((
◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E2 → K
)
→
(
(¬◦
|G ∨ (◦|¬E1 ⊓ ◦| ¬E2)) ∨K
))
. (12)
As was done when discussing Left ◦– , below we only give an Al-proof of the above
formula for the case when G = G. The case when G is empty is simpler, and the cases
when G contains more than one formula would take more steps but otherwise would
be similar.
1. ◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1, ¬◦
|G, ◦| ¬E1 (from axioms ◦
|G,¬◦
|G and ◦
|E1, ◦| ¬E1 by ∧-introduction)
2. (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1) ∧ ¬K, ¬◦
|G, ◦| ¬E1, K (from 1 and axiom ¬K,K by ∧-introduction)
3. (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1) ∧ ¬K, (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E2) ∧ ¬K, ¬◦
|G, ◦| ¬E1, K (from 2 by weakening)
4. (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1) ∧ ¬K, (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E2) ∧ ¬K, ¬◦
|G, ◦| ¬E2, K (similar to 3)
5. (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1) ∧ ¬K, (◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E2) ∧ ¬K, ¬◦
|G, ◦| ¬E1 ⊓ ◦| ¬E2, K
(from 3 and 4 by ⊓-introduction)
6.
(
(◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E1) ∧ ¬K
)
∨
((
(◦
|G ∧ ◦
|E2) ∧ ¬K
)
∨
(
(¬◦
|G ∨ (◦| ¬E1 ⊓ ◦|¬E2)) ∨K
))
(from 5 by ∨-introduction applied several times)
Now, (12) is just an abbreviation of 6. From (9), (10) and ⊢⊢(12), by modus ponens
applied twice, we infer
⊢⊢(¬◦
|G ∨ (◦|¬E1 ⊓ ◦| ¬E2)) ∨K.
But, by Lemma 4.3, ⊢⊢◦| ¬E1 ⊓ ◦|¬E2 → ◦| (¬E1 ⊓ ¬E2). Applying Lemma 3.5, we find
⊢⊢(¬◦
|G ∨ ◦| (¬E1 ⊓ ¬E2)) ∨ K, which is nothing but a disabbreviation of the desired
(11).
Right ⊔: By the induction hypothesis, ⊢⊢◦
|G → Ki. Of course, we also have
Al ⊢ Ki → K1⊔K2 and thus ⊢⊢Ki → K1⊔K2. Hence, by Lemma 3.5, ⊢⊢◦
|G→ K1⊔K2.
Left ⊓: By the induction hypothesis, ⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
|Ei → K, i.e. ⊢⊢(◦|¬G ∨ ◦| ¬Ei) ∨K.
Obviously we also have Al ⊢ ◦| ¬Ei → ◦| (¬E1⊔¬E2) and thus ⊢⊢◦|¬Ei → ◦| (¬E1⊔¬E2).
Hence, by Lemma 3.5, ⊢⊢(◦| ¬G ∨ ◦| (¬E1 ⊔ ¬E2)) ∨K, i.e. ⊢⊢◦
|G ∧ ◦
| (E1 ⊓ ¬E2)→ K.
Right ⊓: By the induction hypothesis, ⊢⊢◦
|G → K1 and ⊢⊢◦
|G → K2. Next, one
could easily verify that Al proves
(◦
|G→ K1)→
(
(◦
|G→ K2)→ (◦
|G→ K1 ⊓K2)
)
,
so this formula is uniformly valid. Applying modus ponens twice yields the desired
⊢⊢◦
|G→ K1 ⊓K2.
27
5 Machines vs. machines
As noted earlier, the rest of this paper is devoted to a proof of the completeness part
of Theorem 2.6. The present section borrows a discussion from [7], providing certain
background information necessary for our completeness proof but missing in [10], the
only external source on computability logic on which this paper was promised to rely.
Remember that ¬Γ, when Γ is a run, means the result of reversing all labels in Γ.
For a run Γ and a computation branch B of an HPM or EPM, we say that B cospells
Γ iff B spells ¬Γ in the sense of Section 6 of [10]. Intuitively, when a machineM plays
as ⊥ (rather than ⊤), then the run that is generated by a given computation branch
B of M is the run cospelled (rather than spelled) by B, for the moves that M makes
get the label ⊥, and the moves that its adversary makes get the label ⊤.
We say that an EPM E is fair iff, for every valuation e, every e-computation branch
of E is fair in the sense of Section 6 of [10].
Lemma 5.1 Assume E is a fair EPM, H is any HPM, and e is any valuation. There
are a uniquely defined e-computation branch BE of E and a uniquely defined e-compu-
tation branch BH of H — which we respectively call the (E , e,H)-branch and the
(H, e, E)-branch — such that the run spelled by BH, called the H vs. E run on e,
is the run cospelled by BE .
When H, E , e are as above, Γ is the H vs. E run on e and A is a game with
WnAe 〈Γ〉 = ⊤ (resp. Wn
A
e 〈Γ〉 = ⊥), we say that H wins (resp. loses) A against E
on e.
A strict proof of the above lemma can be found in [6] (Lemma 20.4), and we will not
reproduce the formal proof here. Instead, the following intuitive explanation should
suffice:
Proof idea. Assume H, E , e are as in Lemma 5.1. The play that we are going to
describe is the unique play generated when the two machines play against each other,
with H in the role of ⊤, E in the role of ⊥, and e spelled on the valuation tapes of both
machines. We can visualize this play as follows. Most of the time during the process
H remains inactive (sleeping); it is woken up only when E enters a permission state,
on which event H makes a (one single) transition to its next computation step — that
may or may not result in making a move — and goes back to sleep that will continue
until E enters a permission state again, and so on. From E ’s perspective, H acts as a
patient adversary who makes one or zero move only when granted permission, just as
the EPM-model assumes. And from H’s perspective, who, like a person in a comma,
has no sense of time during its sleep and hence can think that the wake-up events
that it calls the beginning of a clock cycle happen at a constant rate, E acts as an
adversary who can make any finite number of moves during a clock cycle (i.e. while H
was sleeping), just as the HPM-model assumes. This scenario uniquely determines an
e-computation branch BE of E that we call the (E , e,H)-branch, and an e-computation
branch BH of H that we call the (H, e, E)-branch. What we call the H vs. E run on
e is the run generated in this play. In particular — since we let H play in the role of
⊤ — this is the run spelled by BH. E , who plays in the role of ⊥, sees the same run,
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only it sees the labels of the moves of that run in negative colors. That is, BE cospells
rather than spells that run. This is exactly what Lemma 5.1 asserts. ✸
6 Dedollarization
As we remember, the language of Int, unlike that of Al, treats ⊓ as a strictly binary
operator. Yet in this section we will be writing expressions E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En for unspec-
ified n ≥ 1 and treating them as legitimate (subformulas of) Int-formulas. Such an
expression should be understood as an abbreviation of E1⊓ (E2⊓ (. . .⊓En) . . .)); when
n = 1, E1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ En simply means E1.
An Int-formula is said to be dollarless iff it does not contain $; and an Int-sequent
is dollarless iff all of its formulas are so.
Definition 6.1 Let K be an Int-formula, P1, . . . , Pn all of its nonlogical atoms listed
according to the lexicographic order, and P0 lexicographically the smallest nonlogical
atom not occurring in K. Then what we call the dedollarization of K is the result
of replacing in K every occurrence of $ by the formula P0 ⊓ P1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pn.
Note that the dedollarization of a given formula is (indeed) a dollarless formula.
Lemma 6.2 Whenever the dedollarization of an Int-formula K is provable in Int, so
is K itself.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary Int-formula K, and let F be its dedollarization. We
assume that K, P0, P1, . . . , Pn are as in Definition 6.1. Suppose Int ⊢ F . Let G be
the result of replacing in F every occurrence of P0 by $. Int-provability is known to
be closed under replacing nonlogical atoms by whatever formulas, so we have Int ⊢ G.
Next, it is obvious that ||≡ $ ◦–◦ $ ⊓ P1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pn. This, by Lemma 2.1, implies that
||≡G ◦–◦K, because K is nothing but the result of replacing in G (every occurrence
of) $ ⊓ P1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pn by $. Now, in view of the soundness and completeness of Int
with respect to Kripke semantics, the facts Int ⊢ G and ||≡G ◦–◦K can be seen to
immediately imply Int ⊢ K. ✷
Lemma 6.3 Assume K is an Int-formula, F its dedollarization, and ◦ an interpreta-
tion of a complexity C such that 6|= F ◦. Then there is an interpretation ∗ of the same
complexity C such that 6|= K∗.
Proof. Assume K, F , ◦ and C are as in the conditions of Lemma 6.3. We further
assume that K, P0, P1, . . . , Pn are as in Definition 6.1. We select
∗ to be the unique
interpretation such that:
• P ∗0 = P
◦
0 , P
∗
1 = P
◦
1 , . . . , P
∗
n = P
◦
n ;
• for any nonlogical atom Q with Q 6∈ {P0, P1, . . . , Pn}, Q∗ = P ∗0 (i.e. Q
∗ = P ◦0 );
• the base of $∗ is P ∗0 (i.e. P
◦
0 ).
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Obviously ∗ remains of complexity C. We claim that
|= $∗ → P ∗0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n ;
|= P ∗0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n → $
∗.
(13)
To prove the above, let us fix Q1, Q2, . . . as the lexicographic list of all nonlogical
atoms of the language of Int. $∗ thus can and will be seen as the infinite conjunction
P ∗0 ⊓ Q
∗
1 ⊓ Q
∗
2 ⊓ . . .. In what follows, as always, we rely on the clean environment
assumption. Also, we pretend that P ∗0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n is literally P
∗
0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n
rather than an abbreviation of P ∗0 ⊓ (P
∗
1 ⊓ (. . . ⊓ P
∗
n) . . .)) which it, strictly speaking,
is. This innocent and easy-to-correct inaccuracy is just to simplify our descriptions of
winning strategies.
Here is a relaxed description and analysis of an EPM-strategy for
$∗ → P ∗0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n ,
i.e. for
(P ∗0 ⊓Q
∗
1 ⊓Q
∗
2 ⊓ . . .) → (P
∗
0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n).
Wait until the environment selects a conjunct P ∗i (0 ≤ i ≤ n) in the consequent. Pi is
Qj for a certain j. So, select the conjunct Q
∗
j in the antecedent, and then switch to the
copy-cat strategy CCS. A win is guaranteed because the first two moves have brought
the game down to Q∗j → P
∗
i , i.e. P
∗
i → P
∗
i .
Next, here is a strategy for
P ∗0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n → $
∗,
i.e. for
(P ∗0 ⊓ P
∗
1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ P
∗
n) → (P
∗
0 ⊓Q
∗
1 ⊓Q
∗
2 ⊓ . . .).
Wait till the environment selects a conjunct of the consequent. If the selected conjunct
is Q∗i such that Qi = Pj for some 0 ≤ j ≤ n, then select the conjunct P
∗
j in the
antecedent. This brings the game down to P ∗j → Q
∗
i , i.e. P
∗
j → P
∗
j , so switching to
CCS at this point guarantees success. And otherwise, if the selected conjunct of the
consequent was P ∗0 , or Q
∗
i such that Qi 6∈ {P0, . . . , Pn} so that (by our choice of
∗)
Q∗i = P
∗
0 , then select the conjunct P
∗
0 in the antecedent. This brings the game down
to P ∗0 → P
∗
0 , so, again, switching to CCS at this point guarantees success. (13) is thus
proven.
Now, it is our assumption that 6|= F ◦. But ∗ agrees with ◦ on all atoms of F , and
hence F ◦ = F ∗. So, 6|= F ∗. This, in view of (13) and Lemma 3.5, can be seen to
imply that 6|= K∗, because F is the result of replacing in K (all occurrences of) $ by
P0 ⊓ P1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Pn. ✷
7 Standardization
We say that an Int-sequent is standard iff it is
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦–Z1 ⊔ T1), . . . , Xk ◦– (Yk ◦–Zk ⊔ Tk),
(P1 ◦–Q1) ◦–R1, . . . , (Pk ◦–Qk) ◦–Rk
}
⇒ W
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where k ≥ 0, and the Xi, Yi, Zi, Ti, Pi, Qi, Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and W are nonlogical atoms.
Note that, by definition, a standard Int-sequent is always dollarless.
Where K is a dollarless Int-formula and H is a subformula of it, throughout this
section we will be using the notation
HK
for a certain atom intended to be the “standard atomic name” assigned by us to H as a
subformula ofK. Specifically, let G1, . . . , Gm be all of the non-atomic subformulas ofK
— including K itself — listed according to the lexicographic order, and letW1, . . . ,Wm
be the first (in the lexicographic order) m nonlogical atoms of the language of Int not
occurring in K. Then we define the atom HK by stipulating that:
• HK = H if H is atomic;
• HK =Wi if H = Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
Definition 7.1 Let K be a dollarless Int-formula, and let
A1 = B1 ◦–C1, . . . , Aa = Ba ◦–Ca,
D1 = E1 ⊔ F1, . . . , Dd = Ed ⊔ Fd,
G1 = H1 ⊓ I1, . . . , Gg = Hg ⊓ Ig
be all of its non-atomic subformulas, with each of the three groups listed according to
the lexicographic order. Then we define the standardization of K as the Int-sequent
obtained by appending 3d+ 3g extra copies of the last formula (BKa ◦–CKa ) ◦–AKa to
the antecedent of the following sequent:
AK1 ◦– (BK1 ◦–CK1 ⊔ CK1 ), . . . , AKa ◦– (BKa ◦–CKa ⊔ CKa ),
EK1 ◦– (EK1 ◦–DK1 ⊔DK1 ), . . . , EKd ◦– (EKd ◦–DKd ⊔DKd ),
FK1 ◦– (FK1 ◦–DK1 ⊔DK1 ), . . . , FKd ◦– (FKd ◦–DKd ⊔DKd ),
DK1 ◦– (DK1 ◦–EK1 ⊔ FK1 ), . . . , DKd ◦– (DKd ◦–EKd ⊔ FKd ),
GK1 ◦– (GK1 ◦–HK1 ⊔HK1 ), . . . , GKg ◦– (GKg ◦–HKg ⊔HKg ),
GK1 ◦– (GK1 ◦– IK1 ⊔ IK1 ), . . . , GKg ◦– (GKg ◦– IKg ⊔ IKg ),
HK1 ◦– (IK1 ◦–GK1 ⊔GK1 ), . . . , HKg ◦– (IKg ◦–GKg ⊔GKg ),
(BK1 ◦–CK1 ) ◦–AK1 , . . . , (BKa ◦–CKa ) ◦–AKa


⇒ KK .
Observe that the standardization of a dollarless Int-formula is always (indeed) a
standard sequent.
Lemma 7.2 Let K be a dollarless Int-formula, G ⇒ W its standardization, and K
a Kripke model with K||≡G. Then every subformula H of K is K-equivalent to HK .
Specifically, as KK =W , we have K||≡K ◦–◦W .
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Proof. Let K, G ⇒ W , K = (W ,R, |≡ ) be as the lemma assumes, and H be
any subformula of K. We need to show that K||≡H ◦–◦HK , which will be done by
induction on the complexity of H .
Case 1: H is atomic. Then HK = H , so this case is trivial.
Case 2: H = E ◦– F . Then HK ◦– (EK ◦– FK ⊔FK) and (EK ◦–FK) ◦–HK are
among the formulas of G. Therefore, as K||≡G, we have
K||≡HK ◦– (EK ◦– FK ⊔ FK), (EK ◦–FK) ◦–HK . (14)
But, by the induction hypothesis, K||≡EK ◦–◦E and K||≡FK ◦–◦ F . Of course, we
also have K||≡FK ⊔ FK ◦–◦ FK . Therefore, in view of Fact 2.1, (14) can be rewritten
as
K||≡HK ◦– (E ◦–F ), (E ◦–F ) ◦–HK .
As (E ◦–F ) = H , the above means nothing but that K||≡H ◦–◦HK .
Case 3: H = E ⊔ F . Then
K||≡EK ◦– (EK ◦–HK ⊔HK), FK ◦– (FK ◦–HK ⊔HK), HK ◦– (HK ◦–EK ⊔FK),
because G contains the above three formulas and K||≡G. But, by the induction hy-
pothesis, EK and FK are K-equivalent to E and F , respectively. Hence, by Fact
2.1,
K||≡E ◦– (E ◦–HK ⊔HK), F ◦– (F ◦–HK ⊔HK) (15)
and
K||≡HK ◦– (HK ◦–E ⊔ F ). (16)
Consider any world p with p |≡HK . By (16), we also have p |≡HK ◦– (HK ◦–E⊔F ).
Hence, with a moment’s thought, it can be seen that p |≡E ⊔ F , i.e. p |≡H . As p was
arbitrary, we conclude that
K||≡HK ◦–H . (17)
Next, consider any world p with p |≡H , i.e. p |≡E ⊔ F . We should have p |≡E or
p |≡F . Suppose the former is the case (the latter is, of course, similar). From (15) we
also know that p |≡E ◦– (E ◦–HK ⊔HK). Hence it can be seen that p |≡HK . Again,
as p was arbitrary, we conclude that
K||≡H ◦–HK . (18)
Now, (17) and (18) together mean nothing but that K||≡H ◦–◦HK .
Case 4: H = E ⊓ F . Then, for reasons already familiar to us, we have
K||≡HK ◦– (HK ◦–EK ⊔EK), HK ◦– (HK ◦–FK ⊔FK), EK ◦– (FK ◦–HK ⊔HK).
By the induction hypothesis, K||≡EK ◦–◦E and K||≡FK ◦–◦ F , and hence
K||≡HK ◦– (HK ◦–E ⊔ E), HK ◦– (HK ◦–F ⊔ F ) (19)
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and
K||≡E ◦– (F ◦–HK ⊔HK). (20)
Consider any world p. Suppose p |≡H , i.e. p |≡E ⊓ F , meaning that p |≡E and
p |≡F . Then, from (20), we can see that p |≡HK . Now, for vice versa, suppose p |≡HK .
Then, from (19), we can see that p |≡E and p |≡F , which means that p |≡E ⊓ F , i.e.
p |≡H . Thus, p |≡H iff p |≡HK . This, as p was arbitrary, means that K||≡H ◦–◦HK .
✷
Lemma 7.3 AssumeK is a dollarless Int-formula, and G⇒W is its standardization.
Then Int ⊢ K,G⇒W .
Proof. Assume, for a contradiction, that G ⇒ W is the standardization of a
dollarless Int-formula K, and Int 6⊢ K,G ⇒ W . Then, by the completeness of Int
with respect to Kripke semantics, there is a model K = (W ,R, |≡ ) with K /||≡K,G⇒W ,
meaning that, for some world p ∈ W , we have p |≡K, p |≡G and p /|≡W . Obviously we
may assume here that p = 1, so that K||≡G. Then, by Lemma 7.2, K||≡K ◦–◦W . But
this is a contradiction, because we have 1 |≡K and 1 /|≡W . ✷
Lemma 7.4 Assume K is a dollarless Int-formula, G ⇒ W is its standardization,
and Int 6⊢ K. Then Int 6⊢ G⇒W .
Proof. Consider an arbitrary dollarless Int-formula K and its standardization
G ⇒ W . We assume that all of the conditions of Definition 7.1 regarding the sub-
formulas of K are satisfied, so that each formula of G is one of the formulas of the
antecedent of the sequent displayed in that definition.
Suppose Int 6⊢ K. Then, by the completeness of Int with respect to Kripke seman-
tics, there is a model K with K /||≡K. We may assume here that, for every subformula H
of K, K||≡HK ◦–◦H . Indeed, when H is atomic, then it is automatically K-equivalent
to HK because H = HK . And if H is not atomic, then HK is not among the atoms of
K, and we may make arbitrary assumptions regarding what worlds force HK without
affecting the fact that K /||≡K; so, our assumption is that HK is forced exactly by the
worlds that force H .
Now we claim that K||≡G. To prove this claim, pick an arbitrary formula G of G.
We need to show that K||≡G. Looking back at the sequent displayed in Definition 7.1,
there are 8 cases to consider, depending on the form of G. Here we will only consider
the case
G = AKi ◦– (BKi ◦–CKi ⊔ CKi ),
leaving the other 7 cases as rather similar and equally easy exercises for the reader. Re-
member that, by our assumptions, for every relevant formulaH (here H ∈ {Ai, Bi, Ci})
we have K||≡HK ◦–◦H . So, in view of Fact 2.1, in order to verify that K||≡G, it would
suffice to show that K||≡Ai ◦– (Bi ◦–Ci⊔Ci). But, by the conditions of Definition 7.1,
Ai = Bi ◦–Ci. So, our task reduces to showing that K||≡ (Bi ◦–Ci) ◦– (Bi ◦–Ci⊔Ci).
Since K||≡Ci ⊔ Ci ◦–◦Ci, this task further reduces to “showing” the trivial fact that
K||≡ (Bi ◦–Ci) ◦– (Bi ◦–Ci).
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Thus, we consider K||≡G proven. Then, by Lemma 7.2, K||≡W ◦–◦K. But K /||≡K,
and thus K /||≡W . This means that K /||≡G ⇒ W . Consequently, by the soundness of
Int with respect to Kripke semantics, Int 6⊢ G⇒W . ✷
8 Desequentization
Consider an arbitrary standard Int-sequent
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦–Z1 ⊔ T1), . . . , Xk ◦– (Yk ◦–Zk ⊔ Tk),
(P1 ◦–Q1) ◦–R1, . . . , (Pk ◦–Qk) ◦–Rk
}
⇒ W. (21)
For any positive integer n, we define the n-desequentization of the above sequent
(21) as the following Al-formula (22) where, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and p ∈ {1, . . . , n},
P pj = Pj and Q
p
j = Qj ,
and where E1 ∧ . . . ∧ En is understood as just E1 when n = 1:
◦
|
(
X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1 ⊔ T1
)
∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|
(
Xk ∧ Yk → Zk ⊔ Tk
)
∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P 11 → Q
1
1) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
|Pn1 → Q
n
1 )→ R1
)
∧ . . . ∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P 1k → Q
1
k) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| Pnk → Q
n
k )→ Rk
) → W. (22)
Lemma 8.1 Assume n is an arbitrary positive integer, K is a dollarless Int-formula,
and D is the n-desequentization of the standardization of K. Then, for any interpre-
tation ◦ with |= K◦, we have |= D◦.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary n ≥ 1, an arbitrary dollarless Int-formula K and
an arbitrary interpretation ◦ with |= K◦. We assume that (21) is the standardization
of K, so that the n-desequentization D of the standardization of K is (22).
Using G1, . . . , G2k as abbreviations of the 2k formulas of the antecedent of (21), we
rewrite (21) as
G1, . . . , G2k ⇒W.
According to Lemma 7.3,
Int ⊢ K,G1, . . . , G2k ⇒W.
From here, applying the Right ◦– rule 2k + 1 times, we get
Int ⊢ K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2k ◦–W ) . . .))
and hence, by the already established soundness of Int,
⊢⊢K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2k ◦–W ) . . .)). (23)
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Next, in a routine syntactic exercise, one can show that the following formula is
provable in Al and hence, by the soundness of Al, it is uniformly valid:(
K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2k ◦–W ) . . .))
)
→
(
◦
|K → (◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2k →W )
)
.
(24)
From (23) and ⊢⊢(24), in view of Fact 3.2, we find
|= ◦
|K◦ → (◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2k →W )
◦. (25)
By Fact 3.3, our assumption |= K◦ implies |= ◦
|K◦. This, in turn, together with
(25), again by Fact 3.2, implies
|= (◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2k →W )
◦.
If we now disabbreviate the Gis, the formula ◦
|G1 ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|G2s →W rewrites as
◦
|
(
◦
|X1 → (◦
| Y1 → Z1 ⊔ T1)
)
∧ . . .∧ ◦
|
(
◦
|Xk → (◦
| Yk → Zk ⊔ Tk)
)
∧ ◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
| P1 → Q1)→ R1
)
∧ . . .∧ ◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
| Pk → Qk)→ Rk
) → W,
which, in turn, is an abbreviation of

◦
|
(
◦
|X1 ∧
(
◦
| Y1 ∧ ¬(Z1 ⊔ T1)
))
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
(
◦
|Xk ∧
(
◦
| Yk ∧ ¬(Zk ⊔ Tk)
))
∨
◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
| P1 → Q1) ∧ ¬R1
)
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
| Pk → Qk) ∧ ¬Rk
)


∨ W. (26)
So, |= (26)◦. Now, of course, Al proves
◦
|Xi ∧
(
◦
| Yi ∧ ¬(Zi ⊔ Ti)
)
→ (◦
|Xi ∧ ◦
| Yi) ∧ ¬(Zi ⊔ Ti)
and hence, by the soundness of Al, the above formula is uniformly valid for each
1 ≤ i ≤ k. Therefore, starting from the fact |= (26)◦ and applying Lemma 3.5 k times,
we find that the following formula is uniformly valid:

◦
|
(
(◦
|X1 ∧ ◦
| Y1) ∧ ¬(Z1 ⊔ T1)
)
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
(
(◦
|Xk ∧ ◦
| Yk) ∧ ¬(Zk ⊔ Tk)
)
∨
◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
|P1 → Q1) ∧ ¬R1
)
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
(
◦
| (◦
|Pk → Qk) ∧ ¬Rk
)


∨ W. (27)
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Next, due to the presence of ◦| -contraction, Al clearly proves
◦
| (◦
| Pi → Qi) → ◦
| (◦
|P 1i → Q
1
i ) ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
| (◦
| Pni → Q
n
i )
(any 1 ≤ i ≤ k) and, by soundness, the above formula is uniformly valid. Therefore,
starting from |= (27)◦ and applying Lemma 3.5 k times, we find that the following
formula is uniformly valid:


◦
|
(
(◦
|X1 ∧ ◦
| Y1) ∧ ¬(Z1 ⊔ T1)
)
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
(
(◦
|Xk ∧ ◦
| Yk) ∧ ¬(Zk ⊔ Tk)
)
∨
◦
|
((
◦
| (◦
| P 11 → Q
1
1) ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
| (◦
| Pn1 → Q
n
1 )
)
∧ ¬R1
)
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
((
◦
| (◦
| P 1k → Q
1
k) ∧ . . . ∧ ◦
| (◦
| Pnk → Q
n
k )
)
∧ ¬Rk
)


∨ W. (28)
Next, consider the formula

◦
|
(
(X1 ∧ Y1) ∧ ¬(Z1 ⊔ T1)
)
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
(
(Xk ∧ Yk) ∧ ¬(Zk ⊔ Tk)
)
∨
◦
|
((
(◦
| P 11 → Q
1
1) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
|Pn1 → Q
n
1 )
)
∧ ¬R1
)
∨ . . .∨
◦
|
((
(◦
| P 1k → Q
1
k) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| Pnk → Q
n
k )
)
∧ ¬Rk
)


∨ W. (29)
Observe that (29) is nothing but the result of deleting ◦
| before every subformula Xi, Yi
and (◦
|P pi → Q
p
i ) in (28). And, of course, for any (such sub)formula E, Al ⊢ ◦
|E → E
and hence ⊢⊢◦
|E → E. Therefore, starting from |= (28)◦ and applying Lemma 3.5
k+k+nk times, we infer that |= (29)◦. But (29) is a disabbreviation of (22), and thus
the desired |= (22)◦ holds. ✷
9 Main lemma
Lemma 9.1 Assume G ⇒ K is a standard Int-sequent, K is a Kripke model of size
n with K||≡G and K /||≡W , and D is the n-desequentization of G⇒W . Then D is not
valid; specifically, there is an interpretation ◦ of complexity ⊔ΣB1 such that 6|= D◦.
The present long section is entirely devoted to a proof of this lemma. It will be
seen in the last, very short section of this paper that Lemma 9.1, in combination with
some earlier-proven lemmas, almost immediately implies the sought completeness of
Int with respect to the semantics of computability logic.
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9.1 Main claim
Let us get started with our proof of Lemma 9.1. We pick and fix an arbitrary standard
Int-sequent
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦–Z1 ⊔ T1), . . . , Xk ◦– (Yk ◦–Zk ⊔ Tk),
(P1 ◦–Q1) ◦–R1, . . . , (Pk ◦–Qk) ◦–Rk
}
⇒ W (30)
abbreviated as G ⇒ W , a Kripke model K = (W ,R, |≡ ) of size n and assume that
K||≡G and K /||≡W . Let us agree for the rest of this section that:
• j exclusively ranges over 1, . . . , k;
• i exclusively ranges over 1, . . . , 2k;
• p, q exclusively range over 1, . . . , n;
• w, u exclusively range over bit strings.
Next, for each j and p, we let
P pj = Pj and Q
p
j = Qj .
Then the n-desequentization of (30) is
◦
|
(
X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1 ⊔ T1
)
∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|
(
Xk ∧ Yk → Zk ⊔ Tk
)
∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P 11 → Q
1
1) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
|Pn1 → Q
n
1 )→ R1
)
∧ . . . ∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P 1k → Q
1
k) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| Pnk → Q
n
k )→ Rk
) → W. (31)
Thus, our goal is to find a counterinterpretation (of complexity ⊔ΣB1 ) for the for-
mula (31), with a counterinterpretation here meaning an interpretation ◦ such that
6|= (31)◦.
Remember, from Section 7 of [10], the distinction between general and elementary
letters (=atoms when 0-ary). Elementary letters are to be interpreted as predicates,
while general letters can be interpreted as arbitrary static games. The atoms of the lan-
guages of Int and Al, as we know, are general rather than elementary. However, when
it comes to interpretations, formulas with only elementary letters — called elementary-
base formulas — are both technically and intuitively easier to deal with than those with
general letters. For this reason, we are going to replace (31) with the elementary-base
— though no longer propositional — formula (32) of the same form as (31), and then
construct a counterinterpretation for (32) rather than (31).
In particular, for each (general, 0-ary) nonlogical atom A of the language of Int,
we fix a unique 1-ary elementary letter A˙— unique in the sense that whenever A 6= B,
we also have A˙ 6= B˙. We also fix a variable x and, for each atom A of the language of
Int, agree on the abbreviation A˘ defined by
A˘ = ⊔xA˙(x).
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Now, the above-mentioned elementary-base formula (32) is simply obtained from (31)
through replacing every atom A by A˘:
◦
|
(
X˘1 ∧ Y˘1 → Z˘1 ⊔ T˘1
)
∧ . . . ∧ ◦
|
(
X˘k ∧ Y˘k → Z˘k ⊔ T˘k
)
∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 11 → Q˘
1
1) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘n1 → Q˘
n
1 )→ R˘1
)
∧ . . . ∧
◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1k → Q˘
1
k) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nk → Q˘
n
k )→ R˘k
) → W˘ . (32)
The language in which (32) is written is a sublanguage of the otherwise more ex-
pressive first-order language of Section 7 of [10]. Specifically, every atom of this sub-
language is nonlogical, elementary and 1-ary, and the only variable that may occur in
formulas is x. Hence, the meanings of the terms “(admissible) interpretation”, “valid”
and “uniformly valid”, when used in this new context, should be understood as de-
fined in [10] which, of course, are fully consistent with the meanings of these terms as
(re)defined in the previous sections of this paper for the languages of Int and Al. For
simplicity, we agree that, in contexts dealing with (32), by just “interpretation” we
always mean (32)-admissible interpretation (all but some pathological interpretations
would be automatically (32)-admissible, anyway). And let us agree to say that such
an interpretation ⋆ is of complexity ΣB1 iff, for every atom A of the language of Int,
the game A˙⋆(x) is in ΣB1 (see Subsection 2.4).
We label the following statement and subsequent similar statements “claims” rather
than “lemmas” because they are true only in our particular context, set by the assump-
tions that we have already made within the present proof of Lemma 9.1.
Claim 9.2 There is an interpretation ⋆ of complexity ΣB1 such that 6|= (32)
⋆.
Before we attempt to prove Claim 9.2, let us see that it implies the main Lemma 9.1.
According to this claim, we have 6|= (32)⋆, where ⋆ is a certain interpretation sending
every atom of (32) to a Boolean combination of Σ1-predicates. Let now
◦ be the
interpretation that sends every atom A of the language of Int to A˘⋆. It is easy to see
that then (31)◦ = (32)⋆, so that 6|= (31)◦. And clearly ◦ is of the desired complexity
⊔ΣB1 , because A◦ = A˘⋆ =⊔xA˙⋆(x). As (31) is the n-desequentization of (30), we find
Lemma 9.1 proven.
So, the “only” remaining duty within our proof of the main Lemma 9.1 is to prove
Claim 9.2. The rest of this section is solely devoted to that task.
9.2 Terminology and notation
Note that, since each atom of (32) is to be interpreted as an elementary game, the
structure (Lr component) of the game (32)⋆ does not depend on the selection of an
interpretation ⋆. This nice property of elementary-base formulas was one of our reasons
for choosing to deal with (32) instead of (31). In many contexts, it allows us to
terminologically treat (32) as if it was a game, even though, strictly speaking, it is just
a formula, and becomes a game only after an interpretation is applied to it. Namely,
we can and will unambiguously say “legal run of (32)”, meaning “legal run of (32)⋆ for
some (= every) interpretation ⋆”.
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We will often need to differentiate between subformulas of (31) or (32) and partic-
ular occurrences of such. It should be remembered that the expressions “P pj ”, “P˘
p
j ”,
“X˘j ∧ Y˘j”, etc. are metaexpressions, denoting subformulas of (31) or (32). As it hap-
pens, for different occurrences of subformulas of (31) or (32) we have chosen different
metaexpressions, so those occurrences can be safely identified with the correspond-
ing metaexpressions. To avoid possible notational confusions, we will write “⌊P pj ⌋”,
“⌊P˘ pj ⌋”, “⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋”, etc. to indicate that we mean metaexpressions (= particular
occurrences of subformulas) rather than the formulas for which those expressions stand.
So, say, when we write X˘i = X˘j or X˘i = Z˘j, we mean that X˘i and X˘j , or X˘i and
Z˘j, are identical as formulas; on the other hand, by writing ⌊X˘i⌋ = ⌊X˘j⌋ we will mean
that the two metaexpressions “X˘i” and “X˘j” are graphically identical, i.e., that X˘i
and X˘j stand for the same occurrence of the same subformula of (32), which implies
that i = j. And, as the expressions “X˘” and “Z˘” are graphically different from each
other, we would never have ⌊X˘i⌋ = ⌊Z˘j⌋, no matter what i and j are.
Consider any particular legal position or run Γ of (32). Since (32) is a→-combination
of games, every move of Γ has the form 1.α or 2.α. Intuitively, 1.α means the move
α made in the antecedent of (32), and 2.α the move α made in the consequent. Cor-
respondingly, we think of Γ as consisting of two subruns which, using the notational
conventions of Subsection 4.3 of [10], are denoted by Γ1. and Γ2.. We will be referring
to Γ2. as the Γ-residual position of ⌊W˘ ⌋, because, intuitively, Γ2. is what remains
of Γ after discarding in it everything but the part that constitutes a run in the ⌊W˘ ⌋
component of (32). Note that we wrote ⌊W˘ ⌋ here. Using just W˘ instead could have
been ambiguous, for W˘ , as a formula, may (and probably does) have many occurrences
in (32), while ⌊W˘ ⌋ refers to the occurrence of that formula in the consequent and only
there. Also, we said “position” rather than “run”. It is safe to do so because Γ2.,
which has to be a legal run of the game W˘ =⊔xW˙ (x) (for otherwise Γ would not be
a legal run of (32)), contains at most one labmove — namely, it is 〈〉 or 〈⊤a〉 for some
constant a.
As for Γ1., it is a legal run of the negation of the antecedent of (32) rather than the
antecedent itself. That is so because, as we remember, a game A → B is defined as
¬A∨B. And this means nothing but that ¬Γ1. is a legal run of the antecedent of (32).
Accordingly, we will be interested in ¬Γ1. rather than Γ1., because we find it more
convenient to see the antecedent of (32) as it is, without a negation. The antecedent of
(32), in turn, is a ∧-conjunction, and we think of ¬Γ1. as consisting of as many subruns
as the number of conjuncts. Namely, each such subrun is ¬Γ1.i. for some i. If here
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we call ¬Γ1.i. the Γ-residual run of ⌊◦
| (X˘i ∧ Y˘i → Z˘i ⊔ T˘i)⌋, and if
i = k + j, we call ¬Γ1.i. the Γ-residual run of
⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j ) → R˘j
)
⌋.
As in the case of ⌊W˘ ⌋, such names correspond to the intuitive meanings of ¬Γ1.i.. For
example, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k, ¬Γ1.j. can be characterized as the part of Γ that constitutes
a run in the ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋ component. Such a run should be a legal run of
the game (represented by) ◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j), for otherwise Γ would not be a legal
run of (32).
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Assume Ψ is the Γ-residual run of ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋. We will be referring to
the bitstring tree Tree◦
..
.
(X˘j∧Y˘j→Z˘j⊔T˘j)〈Ψ〉 (see Subsection 4.6 of [10]) as the Γ-residual
⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree. Intuitively, this is the underlying BT structure of the
subrun of Γ that is taking place in the ⌊◦
| (X˘j∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⊔ T˘j)⌋ component of (32). Then
the run Ψ is further thought of as consisting of multiple legal runs of X˘j∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⊔ T˘j ,
specifically, the run Ψw (again, see Subsection 4.6 of [10]) for each complete branch w
of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree. Notice that such a Ψw, as a legal run of
X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j , would be finite, containing at most 4 labmoves. Hence we can refer
to it as “position” rather than “run”. We call such a position Ψw the Γ-residual
position of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w. The Γ-residual
⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j ) → R˘j
)
⌋-tree
and the Γ-residual run of
⌊((◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j ) → R˘j⌋
w
(where w is a complete branch of that tree) are defined similarly. In this case, for
safety, we say run rather than position, for the game (represented by) (◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧
. . .∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j ) → R˘j is not finite-depth because of its ◦
| P˘ pj -components, and hence
the corresponding Ψw may be infinite.
Assume w is a complete branch of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree,
and Θ is the Γ-residual position of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w. Such a Θ is thought of
as consisting of two subpositions: ¬Θ1. and Θ2.. We respectively refer to these as
the Γ-residual position of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋w and the Γ-residual position of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w.
In turn, ¬Θ1. is further seen as consisting of two subpositions ¬Θ1.1. and ¬Θ1.2., to
which we respectively refer as the Γ-residual position of ⌊X˘j⌋w and the Γ-residual
position of ⌊Y˘j⌋w. Similarly, if w is a complete branch of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j →
Q˘1j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j
)
⌋-tree and Θ is the Γ-residual run of
⌊(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j⌋
w,
we respectively refer to
1. ¬Θ1.,
2. Θ2.,
3. ¬Θ1.p.,
4. Θ1.p.1. and
5. ¬Θ1.p.2.
as the Γ-residual runs of
1. ⌊(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )⌋
w,
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2. ⌊R˘j⌋w,
3. ⌊◦
| P˘ pj → Q˘
p
j⌋
w,
4. ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w and
5. ⌊Q˘pj⌋
w,
respectively (in the cases of ⌊R˘j⌋w and ⌊Q˘
p
j⌋
w we can always say “position” instead of
“run”, of course).
Assume w is a complete branch of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj →
Q˘nj ) → R˘j
)
⌋-tree, and Υ is the Γ-residual run of ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w. We call Tree◦
..
.
P˘
p
j 〈Υ〉 the Γ-
residual ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree. Υ is then further seen as consisting of multiple legal positions
of P˘ pj , specifically, the position Υ
u for each complete branch u of the Γ-residual
⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree. We refer to such a position Υu as the Γ-residual position of ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u .
In the above terminological conventions we have started writing “⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋w”,
“⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u ”, etc. Formally these, just like simply “⌊X˘i ∧ Y˘i⌋” or “⌊P˘i⌋”, are metaex-
pressions. If, say, we write ⌊X˘i⌋w = ⌊X˘j⌋u, we imply that the two components are
graphically the same, here meaning that i = j and w = u. Note that such metaexpres-
sions would not always be finite. For instance, ⌊X˘i⌋w would be infinite if the bitstring
w is so; this, however, can only be the case when Γ is an infinite run.
What we call the residual molecules of Γ, or simply Γ-molecules, are the fol-
lowing metaexpressions:
• ⌊W˘ ⌋;
• ⌊X˘j⌋w, ⌊Y˘j⌋w and ⌊Z˘j ⊔ Tj⌋w for each j and each complete branch w of the
Γ-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree.
• ⌊Q˘pj⌋
w and ⌊R˘j⌋w for each j, p and each complete branch w of the Γ-residual
⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j
)
⌋-tree.
• ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u for each j, p, each complete branch w of the Γ-residual ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧
. . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j ) → R˘j
)
⌋-tree and each complete branch u of the Γ-residual
⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree.
We may say just “molecule” instead of “Γ-molecule” when Γ is fixed in a given
context or is irrelevant.
We say that the types of the above 7 sorts of molecules are W , Xj, Yj , Zj ⊔ Tj ,
Qj, Rj and Pj , respectively. When irrelevant, the index j can be omitted here. We
differentiate between types and what we call metatypes. The metatype of ⌊W˘ ⌋ is the
metaexpression ⌊W ⌋; the metatype of ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u is the metaexpression ⌊P
p
j ⌋; the metatype
of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is the metaexpression ⌊Zj ⊔ Tj⌋; the metatype of ⌊X˘j⌋w is the metaex-
pression ⌊Xj⌋, and similarly for ⌊Y˘j⌋w, ⌊Q˘
p
j⌋
w, ⌊R˘j⌋w. As in the case of types, the
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indices j and/or p can be omitted here when irrelevant. Notice that if two molecules
have different types, then they also have different metatypes, but not vice versa: for
instance, ⌊X˘j⌋w and ⌊Y˘j⌋v would always have different metatypes (because “X” 6=“Y ”),
but their types may be identical, meaning that so are the atoms of (31) for the occur-
rences of which Xj and Yj stand. And, where q 6= p, the two molecules ⌊Q
p
j⌋
w and
⌊Qqj⌋
w would always have identical types but different metatypes.
⌊W ⌋-, ⌊X⌋-, ⌊Y ⌋- and ⌊Q⌋-metatype molecules are said to be positive; and ⌊Z ⊔ T ⌋-,
⌊R⌋- and ⌊P ⌋-metatype molecules are said to be negative. When one of two molecules
M1,M2 is positive and the other is negative, we say that M1 and M2 have opposite
genders. Mark the fact that, for a Γ-residual molecule M , the Γ-residual position of
M is always 〈〉 or 〈⊤a〉 for some constant a unless M is ⌊Z ⊔ T ⌋-metatype, in which
case the Γ-residual position of M is always 〈〉, 〈⊤d〉 or 〈⊤d,⊤a〉 for some constant a
and some d ∈ {1, 2}. Note that here, when M is negative, the moves (if any) are made
by player ⊥ even though they are ⊤-labeled.
Let M be a Γ-molecule, and Φ the Γ-residual position of M . To what we will be
referring as the content of M in Γ, or the Γ-content of M , or the content of M
as a Γ-residual molecule, or — when Γ is clear from the context or is irrelevant —
simply the content of M , is the formula C such that:
• If the type of M is A with A ∈ {W,Xj, Yj , Qj , Rj , Pj | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, then:
– if Φ = 〈〉, then C =⊔xA˙(x);
– if Φ = 〈⊤a〉, then C = A˙(a).
• If the type of M is Zj ⊔ Tj , then:
– if Φ = 〈〉, then C =⊔xZ˙j(x) ⊔⊔xT˙j(x);
– if Φ = 〈⊤1〉, then C =⊔xZ˙j(x);
– if Φ = 〈⊤1,⊤a〉, then C = Z˙j(a);
– if Φ = 〈⊤2〉, then C =⊔xT˙j(x);
– if Φ = 〈⊤2,⊤a〉, then C = T˙j(a).
Note that two molecules may have identical contents even if their metatypes (but
not types!) are different.
Let M be a Γ-residual molecule, and C its content in Γ. We say that M , as a
Γ-residual molecule (or in Γ) is:
• grounded iff C is of the form A˙(a) (some constant a and atom A of (30));
• ⊔x-contentual iff C is of the form ⊔xA˙(x);
• ⊔-contentual iff C is of the form ⊔xA˙(x) ⊔⊔xB˙(x).
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Intuitively, the content of a given Γ-molecule M is the game to which the corre-
sponding subgame of (32) has evolved as a result of the moves of Γ made within the
M component. For example, for the molecule ⌊W˘ ⌋, being ⊔x-contentual means that
the moves of Γ have not affected this component, so that, as a (sub)game, it remains
⊔xW˙ (x); and being grounded means that the moves of Γ — in fact, one of such moves
— has brought the game ⊔xW˙ (x) down to W˙ (a) for some constant a. Similarly for
molecules whose metatypes are ⌊X⌋, ⌊Y ⌋, ⌊P ⌋, ⌊Q⌋, ⌊R⌋. On the other hand, for
⌊Z ⊔ T ⌋-metatype molecules, it is being ⊔-contentual rather than ⊔x-contentual that
means not having been affected by the moves of Γ.
We say that a Γ-molecule M1 is matchingly grounded (in Γ) iff M1 is grounded
and there is another grounded Γ-molecule M2 such that M1 and M2 have opposite
genders but identical contents. If M1 is grounded but not matchingly so, then we say
that it is non-matchingly grounded.
Note that, for a Γ-residual molecule M , the content of M , as well as whether M
is (matchingly) grounded, ⊔x-contentual or ⊔-contentual, depends on Γ. That is why,
unless Γ is fixed or clear from the context, for safety we should say “the content of
M in Γ” instead of just “the content of M”, say “M is grounded in Γ” or “M , as a
Γ-molecule, is grounded” instead of just “M is grounded”, etc. The point is that the
same metaexpression M can be a residual molecule of two different runs. Relevant to
our interests are only the cases when one run, say Γ1, is an initial segment of the other
run, say Γ2. Assume this is so for the rest of the present paragraph, and assumeM is a
Γ1-molecule. If M = ⌊W˘ ⌋, M will also be a Γ2-molecule. It is possible, however, that
M is ⊔x-contentual in Γ1 while grounded in Γ2; and if so, the content of M in Γ1 will
be different from that in Γ2. And it is also generally possible thatM is non-matchingly
grounded in Γ1 while matchingly grounded in Γ2. Similarly when the metatype of M
is anything other than ⌊W ⌋. However, when M is a non-⌊W ⌋-metatype Γ1-molecule
such as, say, ⌊X˘j⌋w, then there is no guarantee that M is also a Γ2-molecule. For
instance, if (Γ2 6= Γ1 and) in position Γ1 the player ⊤ made a replicative move in the
⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋ component of the game which split (i.e. extended to w0 and
w1) the leaf w of the Γ1-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree, then w would be just an
internal node rather than a complete branch of the Γ2-residual ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j⊔ T˘j)⌋-
tree, meaning that M = ⌊X˘j⌋w is not a residual molecule of Γ2. Instead of ⌊X˘j⌋w,
in the general case, Γ2 could have many residual molecules of the form ⌊X˘j⌋w
′
, where
w  w′. Let us agree to say about each such Γ2-molecule ⌊X˘j⌋w
′
that it descends from
⌊X˘j⌋w, or that ⌊X˘j⌋w is the Γ1-predecessor— or simply a predecessor if we do not
care about details — of ⌊X˘j⌋
w′ . Similarly for the cases when M is ⌊Y˘j⌋
w, ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋
w,
⌊Q˘pj⌋
w or ⌊R˘j⌋w. And rather similarly for the case M = ⌊P˘
p
j ⌋
w
u : in this caseM will be
said to be the Γ1-predecessor (or just a predecessor) of every Γ2-molecule ⌊P˘
p
j ⌋
w′
u′
such that w  w′ and u  u′; and, correspondingly, every such ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w′
u′ will be said to
descend from ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u . Extending this terminology to the remaining case of M = ⌊W˘ ⌋,
the latter is always its own (single) descendant and predecessor.
Here comes some more terminology. In the context of a given legal position Γ of
(32), whereM is a⊔x-contentual Γ-molecule, to groundM intuitively means to make
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a (legal) move that makes M grounded; we say that such a move is patient if M is
the only molecule whose content it modifies. Informally speaking, a patient move for
a non-⌊W ⌋-metatype molecule M means that the move is made in the corresponding
leaf (or two nested leaves if M is ⌊P ⌋-metatype) rather than internal node(s) of the
corresponding underlying BT(s), for a move in an internal node v would simultaneously
affect several molecules — all those that are associated with leaves r such that v  r.
In precise terms, we have:
• To ground ⌊W˘ ⌋ means to make the move 2.a for some constant a. This sort of a
move is automatically patient.
• To ground ⌊X˘j⌋
w (resp. ⌊Y˘j⌋
w, resp. ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋
w) means to make the move
1.j.w′.1.1.a (resp. 1.j.w′.1.2.a, resp. 1.j.w′.2.a) for some bitstring w′  w and
some constant a. Such a move is patient iff w′ = w.
• To ground ⌊R˘j⌋w means to make the move 1.i.w′.2.a for i = k+ j, some bitstring
w′  w and some constant a. Again, such a move is patient iff w′ = w.
• To ground ⌊Q˘pj⌋
w means to make the move 1.i.w′.1.p.2.a for i = k + j, some
bitstring w′  w and some constant a. Again, such a move is patient iff w′ = w.
• To ground ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u means to make the move 1.i.w
′.1.p.1.u′.a for i = k + j, some
bitstrings w′  w and u′  u, and some constant a. Such a move patient iff both
w′ = w and u′ = u.
Notice that player ⊤ can only ground positive molecules, while player ⊥ can only
ground negative molecules. Every grounding move thus has the form α.a for some
constant a. Let us call such a constant a the choice constant of the grounding move.
Then we say that a given act (move) of grounding is done diversifyingly iff the move
is patient, and its choice constant is the smallest constant that has never been used
before in the play (run) as the choice constant of some grounding move.
Only⊔x-contentual molecules can be grounded. As for ⊔-contentual molecules, be-
fore they can be grounded, they should be dedisjunctionized. That is, a move should
be made that changes their status from ⊔-contentual to⊔x-contentual. Precisely, for a
⊔-contentual molecule ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w, such a move is 1.j.w.2.1 or 1.j.w.2.2.6 The effect of
the move 1.j.w.2.1 is turning the molecule’s content⊔xZ˙j(x)⊔⊔xT˙j(x) into⊔xZ˙j(x),
and therefore we say “to Z-dedisjunctionize” for making such a dedisjunctionizing
move. And the effect of the move 1.j.w.2.2 is turning the molecule’s content into
⊔xT˙j(x), so we say “to T -dedisjunctionize” is this case. Note that, since ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w
is negative, it can only be dedisjunctionized by player ⊥, even though (or therefore),
in the resulting position, the move 1.j.w.2.1 or 1.j.w.2.2 will be ⊤-labeled.
As before, assume Γ is a (context-setting) legal run of (32). By a Γ-supermolecule
we mean a grounded residual molecule M of some subposition (i.e. a finite initial
segment) Φ of Γ such that for no proper initial segment Ψ of Φ is the Ψ-predecessor of
6Well, just as in the case of grounding, the moves 1.j.w′.2.1 or 1.j.w′.2.2, where w′  w (rather
than necessarily w′ = w) would achieve the same “dedisjunctionizing” effect; however, we do not
consider such cases as they are never going to really emerge in our construction.
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M grounded. We refer to such a Φ as the position of grounding of M , and refer to
the length of Φ as the time of grounding of M .
Obviously any grounded residual molecule M (of Γ or any of its initial segments)
descends from some unique supermolecule. We call the supermolecule from which
M descends the essence of M . Every supermolecule is thus its own essence. Only
grounded molecules have essences. Therefore, if we say “the essence of M”, the claim
that M is grounded is automatically implied. Whether a grounded molecule M is a
supermolecule or not, by the position of grounding and time of grounding of M
we mean those of the essence of M . Intuitively, the position of grounding of such an
M is the position in which M — more precisely, a predecessor of M — first became
grounded, and the time of grounding tells us how soon after the start of the play this
happened. Mark the obvious fact that the content of any grounded molecule is the
same as that of the essence of that molecule.
We define a Γ-chain as any nonempty finite sequence 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 of Γ-supermo-
lecules such that:
1. M1 and only M1 is ⌊P ⌋-metatype.
2. For each odd k with 1 ≤ k < m, Mk is negative, Mk+1 is positive, and the two
supermolecules have identical contents.
3. For each odd k with 3 ≤ k ≤ m, we have:
• if Mk = ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘ ⌋w (some j, w), then Mk−1 is the essence of ⌊X˘j⌋w or the
essence of ⌊Y˘j⌋w;
• if Mk = ⌊R˘j⌋w (some j, w), then Mk−1 is the essence of ⌊Q˘
p
j⌋
w for some
p ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We will simply say “chain” instead of “Γ-chain” when Γ is fixed or irrelevant. As
an aside, observe that, according to the above definition, if ⌊W˘ ⌋ is in a chain, then
it can only be the last element of the chain, and such a chain is of an even length.
All internal (neither the first nor the last) odd-numbered elements of a chain have the
metatype ⌊Z ⊔ T ⌋ or ⌊R⌋, and all internal even-numbered elements have the metatype
⌊X⌋, ⌊Y ⌋ or ⌊Q⌋.
When C = 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 is a chain, we say that C hitsMm, and that C originates
from M1, or that M1 is the origin of C.
We say that a chain C is open iff, where ⌊P pj ⌋ is the metatype of the origin of C,
no element of C has the metatype ⌊Qpj⌋ (for the same j, p).
Where Γ (as before) is a legal run of (32) and M is a Γ-supermolecule, by the
Γ-base of M we mean the set of all worlds p ∈ W such that there is an open Γ-chain
hitting M whose origin is of the metatype ⌊P pj ⌋ for some j (and that very p). If M is
a grounded Γ-molecule but not necessarily a supermolecule, then the Γ-base of M is
defined as the Γ-base of the essence of M . In contexts where Γ is fixed, we denote the
Γ-base of M by Base(M).
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9.3 The counterstrategy
In this subsection we set up a counterstrategy for (32) in the form of an EPM E , which
will act in the role of ⊥ in a play over (32). E is a universal counterstrategy for (32),
in the sense that, as will be shown later, no HPM wins (32)⋆ against this particular,
one-for-all EPM for the yet-to-be-constructed interpretation ⋆. Since E plays as ⊥
rather than ⊤, we will be interested in the run cospelled rather than spelled by any
given computation branch of E . That is, in a play, the moves made by E get the label
⊥, and the moves made by its adversary get the label ⊤. In our description of E and
the further analysis of its behavior, as we did in earlier sections, we will be relying
on the clean environment assumption, here meaning that the adversary of a E never
makes illegal moves. From the definition of E it will be also immediately clear that E
itself does not make any illegal moves either. Since all runs that E generates are thus
legal, we usually omit the word “legal”, and by a run or position we will always mean
a legal run or position of (32).
The work of E consists in sequentially performing the first two or all three (depend-
ing on how things evolve) of the following procedures FIRST, SECOND and THIRD.
In the descriptions of these procedures, “current” should be understood as Φ-residual,
where Φ is the position of the play at the time when a given step is performed. This
word may be omitted, and by just saying “molecule” we mean current molecule. Sim-
ilarly, “⊔-contentual”, “⊔x-contentual”, “(matchingly) grounded”, “to ground”, etc.
should be understood in the context of the then-current position. Similarly, for a
grounded molecule M , Base(M) means the Φ-base of M , where Φ is the then-current
position. Also, since the current position is always a position (finite run), it is safe
to say “leaf” instead of “complete branch” when talking about bitstring trees in our
description of the work of E .
PROCEDURE FIRST: Diversifyingly ground all ⌊P ⌋-metatype molecules, and
go to SECOND.
PROCEDURE SECOND: If ⌊W˘ ⌋ is matchingly grounded, go to THIRD. Else
perform each of the following routines:
Routine 1. For each j and each leaf w of the current ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-
tree, whenever both ⌊X˘j⌋w and ⌊Y˘j⌋w are matchingly grounded and ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is
⊔-contentual, do the following:
(i): if p |≡Z for every world p such that p is accessible from each element of
Base(⌊X˘j⌋w)∪Base(⌊Y˘j⌋w), then Z-dedisjunctionize ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w, after which diversi-
fyingly ground (the now ⊔x-contentual) ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w;
(ii): else T -dedisjunctionize ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w, after which diversifyingly ground (the now
⊔x-contentual) ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w.
Routine 2. For each j and each leaf w of the current ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j)∧. . .∧(◦
| P˘nj →
Q˘nj )→ R˘j
)
⌋-tree, whenever each ⌊Q˘pj⌋
w (1 ≤ p ≤ n) is matchingly grounded and ⌊R˘j⌋w
is ⊔x-contentual, diversifyingly ground ⌊R˘j⌋w.
Routine 3. Grant permission, and repeat SECOND.
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PROCEDURE THIRD:
Step 1: Z-dedisjunctionize all (remaining) ⊔-contentual ⌊Z⊔T ⌋-metatype molecules.
Step 2: Diversifyingly ground all⊔x-contentual ⌊Z⊔T ⌋- and ⌊R⌋-metatype molecules.
Step 3: Go into an infinite loop within a permission state.
Remember that a fair EPM is one whose every e-computation branch (any valuation
e) is fair, i.e. permission is granted infinitely many times in each branch. Before we go
any further, let us make the straightforward observation that
E is a fair EPM. (33)
This is so because THIRD grants permission infinitely many times within Step 3, and
if THIRD is never reached by E , then SECOND will be iterated infinitely many times,
with each iteration granting permission within Routine 3.
Our ultimate goal is to show that (32) is not valid, which, as mentioned, will
be achieved by finding an interpretation ⋆ such that no HPM wins (32)⋆ against E .
We approach this goal by first proving the weaker fact that (32) is not uniformly
valid. In particular, below we are going to show that, for any valuation e and any
e-computation branch B of E , there is an interpretation † such that the run cospelled
by B is a ⊥-won run of (32)†. As will be observed at the beginning of Subsection 9.6,
this fact immediately implies the non-uniform-validity of (32). Such a B-depending
counterinterpretation is going to be what in [8] is called perfect, in our particular
case meaning that for any predicate letter A˙ of (32), A˙†(x) is a finitary predicate that
does not depend on any variables except x. This can be easily seen to make A˘† and
hence (32)† a constant game, allowing us to safely ignore the valuation parameter e
in most contexts, which is irrelevant because neither the game e[A˘†] nor (notice) the
work of E depends on e. To define such an interpretation, it is sufficient to indicate
what constant atomic formulas are made by it true and what constant atomic formulas
are made false. Here and later, for simplicity, by “constant atomic formulas” we mean
formulas of the form A˙(a), where A˙ is a predicate letter occurring in (32) and a is a
constant. For obvious reasons, how † interprets any other atoms is irrelevant, and we
may safely pretend that such atoms simply do not exist in the language.
So, fix any valuation e spelled on the valuation tape of E , and any e-computation
branch B of E . Let Γ be the run cospelled by B. Let us agree to say “ultimate”
(run, position, tree) for “Γ-residual” (run, position, tree). To Γ itself we refer as the
ultimate run of ⌊(32)⌋, or simply the ultimate run. By just saying “molecule”
we mean a residual molecule of Γ or of any initial segment of it. And Γ-molecules
we call ultimate molecules. Any molecule would thus be an ultimate molecule or
a predecessor of such. When M is an ultimate molecule, by just saying that M is
⊔- or ⊔x-contentual, grounded or matchingly grounded we mean that M is so in Γ.
Also, “chain” now always means Γ-chain, and, for any grounded moleculeM , Base(M)
means the Γ-base of M .
We will say that the branch B is short iff, in the process of playing it up, E never
entered the THIRD stage, thus forever remaining in SECOND. Otherwise B is long.
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The scope of all this B- and Γ-dependent terminology and conventions extends to the
following two subsections, throughout which B and Γ are fixed.
Our construction of a counterinterpretation for (32) depends on whether B is short
or long. We consider these two cases separately.
9.4 Constructing a counterinterpretation when B is short
Assume B is short. This, looking at the first line of the description of SECOND, means
that, in the ultimate run of ⌊(32)⌋ (in Γ, that is), W˘ is not matchingly grounded. We
select our
counterinterpretation †
to be the perfect interpretation that makes the contents of all positive non-matchingly
grounded ultimate molecules false, and all other constant atomic formulas true.
Convention 9.3
• Where A˙ is a predicate letter of (32) and a is any constant, we say that A˙(a) is
true iff A˙†(a) is true.
• We say that ⌊(32)⌋ is true iff the ultimate run of ⌊(32)⌋ is a ⊤-won run of (32)†.
• We say that ⌊W˘ ⌋ is true iff the ultimate position of ⌊W˘ ⌋ is a ⊤-won position of
W˘ †.
• We say that ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋ is true iff the ultimate run of ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧
Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋ is a ⊤-won run of
(
◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)
)†
. Similarly for
⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j
)
⌋.
• Where w is a complete branch of the ultimate ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree, we
say that ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is true iff the ultimate run (position) of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is a
⊤-won run of (Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)†. Similarly for ⌊X˘j⌋w, ⌊Y˘j⌋w, ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋w, ⌊Q˘
p
j⌋
w, ⌊R˘j⌋w,
⌊◦
| P˘ pj → Q˘j⌋
w.
• Where w is a complete branch of the ultimate ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj →
Q˘nj ) → Z˘j
)
⌋-tree and u is a complete branch of the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree, we
say that ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u is true iff the ultimate position of ⌊P˘
p
j ⌋
w
u is a ⊤-won position of
(P˘j)
†.
“False” will mean “not true”.
Based on the definitions of ⊔ and ⊔, with a moment’s thought we can see that the
following claim is valid:
Claim 9.4 Let M be an arbitrary ultimate molecule.
(i) If M is ⊔- or ⊔x-contentual, then M is false.
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(ii) If M is grounded, then M is true iff its content is true.
Our goal is to show that ⌊(32)⌋ is false. Throughout the rest of this subsection, we
agree to understand the terms “grounded”, “⊔x-contentual”, etc. in the context of
the ultimate run.
Note that ⌊W˘ ⌋ is guaranteed to be false. Indeed, if ⌊W˘ ⌋ is ⊔x-contentual, it is
false by clause (i) of Claim 9.4. And, if ⌊W˘ ⌋ is grounded, then, as no switch to THIRD
has occured, ⌊W˘ ⌋ must be non-matchingly grounded. Then, with clause (ii) of Claim
9.4 in mind, ⌊W˘ ⌋ can be seen to be false by our choice of †.
As ⌊W˘ ⌋ is false, in order to show that ⌊(32)⌋ is false, it would suffice to verify that,
for each j, both ⌊◦
| (X˘j∧Y˘j → Z˘j⊔T˘j)⌋ and ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j)∧. . .∧(◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j
)
⌋
are true. Why this would suffice can be seen directly from the definitions of ∧ and
→. In turn, based on the definition of ◦
| , the truth of ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋ and
⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j
)
⌋ means nothing but that:
(a) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree,
⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is true, and
(b) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj →
Q˘nj )→ R˘j
)
⌋-tree, ⌊(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j⌋
w is true.
Pick any j, and assume w is as in (a). If ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋
w is grounded, then, with
Claim 9.4(ii) in mind, it is true. This is so because, by our choice of †, only the
contents of positive non-matchingly grounded (ultimate) molecules are made false by
this interpretation; ⌊Z˘j⊔T˘j⌋w is not positive, nor is its content the same as that of some
positive non-matchingly grounded ultimate molecule, for then that molecule would not
be non-matchingly grounded. The truth of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w, in turn, by the definition of→,
can be seen to imply the truth of ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w. Suppose now ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is
not grounded. Analyzing how E acts in Routine 1 of SECOND, this fact can be seen
to indicate that at least one of the two ultimate molecules ⌊X˘j⌋
w and ⌊Y˘j⌋
w — let us
assume it is ⌊X˘j⌋w — is not matchingly grounded. If ⌊X˘j⌋w is ⊔x-contentual, it is
false as are all ⊔x-contentual molecules. And if ⌊X˘j⌋w is non-matchingly grounded, it
is again false by our choice of †. In either case ⌊X˘j⌋w is thus false and hence, as can
be seen from the definition of ∧, so is ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j⌋w. This, in turn, by the definition of
→, makes ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w true. Statement (a) is taken care of.
Assume now w is as in (b). If ⌊R˘j⌋w is grounded, then we are done for the same
reasons as in the previous paragraph when discussing the similar case for ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w.
Suppose now ⌊R˘j⌋w is⊔x-contentual. Reasoning as we did in the corresponding case of
the previous paragraph for “⌊X˘j⌋w or ⌊Y˘j⌋w” (only appealing to Routine 2 of SECOND
instead of Routine 1), we find that, for some p, ⌊Q˘pj⌋
w is false. Therefore, in order to
conclude that ⌊(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j⌋
w is true, it would be sufficient
to show that ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w is true. The truth of ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w means nothing but that, for every
complete branch u of the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree, ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u is true. But this is indeed so.
Consider any complete branch u of the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree. ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u is grounded due
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to the actions of E during FIRST. And, as this molecule is negative, it can be seen to
be true by our choice of †. Statement (b) is thus also taken care of.
So, ⌊(32)⌋ is false, meaning that Γ is a ⊥-won run of (32)†, i.e. Wn(32)
†
〈Γ〉 = ⊥.
9.5 Constructing a counterinterpretation when B is long
Throughout this subsection, we assume B is long, i.e., at some point of playing B up,
E switched from SECOND to THIRD. This means that ⌊W˘ ⌋ is matchingly grounded
in the ultimate run Γ. We let ∆ denote the (finite) initial segment of Γ consisting of
all of the (lab)moves made before the switch to THIRD occurred.
Throughout this subsection, Γ will remain the default, context-setting run for run-
relative terminology and notation such as “supermolecule”, “grounded”, “Base(M)”,
etc.
Claim 9.5 No two different negative supermolecules have identical contents.
Proof. This is so because negative molecules are grounded by E , which always
does grounding in a diversifying way — in a way that ensures that the content of the
resulting molecule is different from that of any other grounded molecule. ✷
The supermolecules whose position of termination is not longer than ∆ we call
old-generation supermolecules. In other words, old-generation supermolecules are
those that became grounded while E was still working within FIRST of SECOND.
We say that a supermolecule M is well-behaved iff, whenever there is an open
chain hitting M and originating from a ⌊P pj ⌋-metatype supermolecule, we have p |≡ Pj .
Claim 9.6 Suppose M is a well-behaved negative old-generation supermolecule, A˙(a)
is its content, and p is a world accessible from every element of Base(M). Then p |≡A.
Proof. Let M , A˙(a), p be as above, and let Φ be the position of grounding of
M . Obviously it is sufficient to assume here — and we will assume — that p is the
R-smallest world accessible from every world of Base(M), in the sense that, for any
q ∈ W , if q is accessible from every element of Base(M), then q is also accessible from
p. This means that R is a linear order on Base(M) with p being its greatest element,
or otherwise Base(M) is empty and p is the root world 1. We proceed by induction
on the time of grounding of M , i.e. the length of Φ. There are three cases to consider,
depending on the metatype of M .
Case 1: M is ⌊P ⌋-metatype, specifically, M = ⌊P˘ qj ⌋
w for some q, j, w. Then
Base(M) = {q} and thus p = q because, according to our assumptions, p is the R-
smallest world accessible from every element of Base(M). And, as M is well-behaved,
we have p |≡ Pj .
Case 2: M is ⌊Z ⊔ T ⌋-metatype, specifically, M = ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w. Since M is second-
generation, ⌊X˘j⌋w should be matchingly grounded in Φ (in fact in a proper initial
segment of Φ), for otherwise E would not have grounded ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w. Let N be the
essence of ⌊X˘j⌋w, and let L be the essence of a negative grounded Φ-molecule whose
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content is the same as that of (⌊X˘j⌋w and hence of) N . The time of grounding of (N
and hence of) L is smaller than that ofM and thus, just likeM , L is an old-generation
supermolecule. Observe that every L-hitting open chain turns into an M -hitting open
chain after appending N andM to it. For this reason, Base(L) ⊆ Base(M) and, since
p is accessible from all elements of Base(M), so is it from all elements of Base(L).
Also, as M is well-behaved, so is L. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
p |≡Xj . (34)
A similar argument convinces us that
p |≡ Yj . (35)
According to our original assumptions regarding K, every world forces every formula of
the antecedent of (30). So, p |≡Xj ◦– (Yj ◦–Zj⊔Tj). This, together with (34) and (35),
implies that p |≡Zj ⊔ Tj . Therefore, either p |≡Zj or p |≡ Tj . It is rather obvious that
Base(M) = Base(⌊Xj⌋w)∪Base(⌊Yj⌋w). Keeping this fact in mind together with our
assumption that p is the R-smallest world accessible from all worlds of Base(M), and
analyzing the work of E within Routine 1 of SECOND, we find that, if p |≡Zj , then
A = Zj, so that p |≡A; and if p /|≡Zj and hence p |≡ Tj, then A = Tj, so that, again,
p |≡A. In either case we thus have p |≡A, as desired.
Case 3: M is ⌊R⌋-metatype, specifically, M = ⌊R˘j⌋w. Then, of course, A = Rj .
We want to show that p |≡ Pj ◦–Qj , from which the desired p |≡Rj (i.e. p |≡A) follows
because, as noted in the previous case, every formula of the antecedent of (30) is forced
by p, including (Pj ◦–Qj) ◦–Rj .
For a contradiction, assume p /|≡Pj ◦–Qj . Then there is a world q accessible from
p such that q |≡ Pj and q /|≡Qj. From Routine 2 of SECOND we see that ⌊Q˘
q
j⌋
w should
be matchingly grounded in the position preceeding Φ (otherwise E would not have
grounded M in that position). Arguing for ⌊Qqj⌋
w as we did in Case 2 for ⌊X˘j⌋w, we
find that there is a negative old-generation supermolecule L whose time of grounding
is smaller than that of M and whose content is the same as that of ⌊Qqj⌋
w, so that the
type of L is Qj . Note that every open chain C hitting L can be extended to a chain
hitting M by adding to C the essence of ⌊Qqj⌋
w and then M ; such a chain will remain
open unless the origin of C was a ⌊P qj ⌋-metatype molecule. Therefore, remembering
that q |≡ Pj , we find that Base(L) is well-behaved, because so is Base(M). With the
above observation in mind, we also find that q can be the only world that is in Base(L)
but not in Base(M). Hence, remembering that p is accessible from every element of
Base(M) and pRq, we find that q is accessible from every element of Base(L). All this
allows us to apply the induction hypothesis to q and L and infer that q |≡Qj , which is
a contradiction. ✷
Claim 9.7 There is an open chain hitting ⌊W˘ ⌋.
Proof. Since B is long, ⌊W˘ ⌋ is matchingly grounded (already) in ∆, so ⌊W˘ ⌋
is an old-generation supermolecule. Let N be a negative grounded ∆-molecule whose
content is identical with that of ⌊W˘⌋, and let M be the essence of N . The type of
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(N and hence) M , of course, should be W . Remember our assumption that K /||≡W ,
i.e. 1 /|≡W . It implies that Base(M) 6= ∅, for otherwise — vacuously — M would be
well-behaved and 1 be accessible from every element of Base(M), whence, by Claim
9.6, we would have 1 |≡W . The fact that Base(M) is nonempty means that there is
an open chain hitting M . The result of adding ⌊W˘ ⌋ to that chain obviously remains
an open chain. ✷
Let us select and fix some— say, lexicographically the smallest — open chain hitting
⌊W˘⌋, and call it the master chain. According to Claim 9.7, such a chain exists. Let
us call the supermolecules that are in the master chain master supermolecules.
Now we are ready to define the
counterinterpretation †.
We define it as the perfect interpretation that makes the content of each master super-
molecule false, and makes all other constant atomic formulas true.
In what follows, we fully adopt the terminology of Convention 9.3, with the only
difference that now the underlying interpretation † on which that terminology is based
is † as defined in the present subsection rather than as defined in Subsection 9.4. As
in Subsection 9.4, our goal is to show that ⌊(32)⌋ is false.
That ⌊W˘ ⌋ is false is immediate from our choice of †. Hence, as in Subsection 9.4,
in order to show that ⌊(32)⌋ is false, it would suffice to verify that, for each j, we have:
(a) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
| (X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j)⌋-tree,
⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is true, and
(b) for every complete branch w of the ultimate ⌊◦
|
(
(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj →
Q˘nj )→ R˘j
)
⌋-tree, ⌊(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j⌋
w is true.
Pick any j, and assume w is as in (a). ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is grounded at least due to
the actions of E during THIRD (in case it otherwise managed to stay non-grounded
throughout SECOND). If the essence of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is not in the master chain, then
its content is true, because the latter, in view of Claim 9.5 and with a little thought,
can be seen to be different from the content of any master supermolecule, and, by our
choice of †, this interpretation only falsifies the contents of master supermolecules. In
turn, from the truth of the content of the essence of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w and hence the truth
of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w we infer that ⌊X˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is true. Suppose now the essence of
⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w is in the master chain. Then, from the definition of chain and with some
thought, we can see that either the essence of ⌊X˘j⌋w or the essence of ⌊Y˘j⌋w should be
there, too. Specifically, such a supermolecule would be the one immediately preceding
the essence of ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w in the master chain. Hence, by our choice of †, either ⌊X˘j⌋w
or ⌊Y˘j⌋w is false, which makes ⌊Z˘j ∧ Y˘j → Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋w true.
Assume now w is as in (b). As was the case with ⌊Z˘j ⊔ T˘j⌋
w in the previous
paragraph, ⌊Rj⌋w is grounded, and, if its essence is not in the master chain, then
its content and hence ⌊(◦
| P˘ 1j → Q˘
1
j) ∧ . . . ∧ (◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j ) → R˘j⌋
w is true. Suppose
now the essence of ⌊R˘j⌋w is in the master chain. Arguing as we did in the previous
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case for ⌊X˘j⌋w or ⌊Y˘j⌋w, we find that, for some p, the essence of ⌊Q˘
p
j⌋
w is a master
supermolecule and hence ⌊Q˘pj⌋
w is false. Therefore, in order to conclude that ⌊(◦
| P˘ 1j →
Q˘1j)∧. . .∧(◦
| P˘nj → Q˘
n
j )→ R˘j⌋
w true, it would suffice to show that ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w is true. The
truth of ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w means nothing but that, for every complete branch u of the ultimate
⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree, ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u is true. But this is indeed so. Consider any complete branch u
of the ultimate ⌊◦
| P˘ pj ⌋
w-tree. ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u is grounded due to the actions during FIRST. Its
essence cannot be in the master chain because the essence of ⌊Q˘pj⌋
w is there and the
master chain is open. But then, in view of Claim 9.5, the content of ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u is different
from that of any master supermolecule, which, by our choice of †, makes ⌊P˘ pj ⌋
w
u true.
Statement (b) is thus also taken care of.
So, ⌊(32)⌋ is false, meaning that Γ is a ⊥-won run of (32)†, i.e. Wn(32)
†
〈Γ〉 = ⊥.
9.6 From non-uniform-validity to non-validity
In the previous two subsections we in fact showed that
(32) is not uniformly valid. (36)
Indeed, suppose, for a contradiction, that (32) is uniformly valid. Let then H be a
uniform HPM-solution for (32) — an HPM that wins (32)∗ for every interpretation
∗. Pick an arbitrary valuation e (which is irrelevant here anyway), and let B be the
(E , e,H)-branch. As observed in (33), E is fair, so the conditions of Lemma 5.1 are
met and such a branch B is defined. Let then † be the interpretation constructed from
B as in Subsection 9.4 or 9.5, depending on whether B is short or long. Then, as we
showed in those two subsections, the run Γ cospelled by B is a ⊤-lost run of (32)†
(= e[(32)†], because the interpretation is perfect). But, by Lemma 5.1, the same Γ is
a run spelled by some e-computation branch of H — specifically, it is the H vs. E run
on e. This means that H does not win (32)†, contrary to our assumption that H is a
uniform solution for (32).
In turn, (36) can be eventually rather easily translated into the fact of completeness
of Int with respect to uniform validity.
Our goal, however, is to show the completeness of Int with respect to validity rather
than just uniform validity — the goal which, as we remember, has been reduced to
showing the non-validity of (32). The fact of non-validity of (32), of course, is stronger
than the fact of its non-uniform-validity. The point is that the counterinterpretation
† constructed in Subsections 9.4 and 9.5 depends on the computation branch B and
hence on the HPM H that plays against E . That is, different Hs could require different
†s. In order to show that (32) is not valid, we need to construct a one, common-for-all-
H counterinterpretation ⋆, with the property that every HPM H loses (32)⋆ against E
for that very interpretation ⋆ on some valuation e. Not to worry, we can handle that.
Let us fix the sequence
H1, H2, H3, . . .
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of all HPMs, enumerated according to the lexicographic order of their standardized
descriptions. Next, we select a variable z different from x and, for each constant c,
define
ec
to be the valuation that sends z to c, and (arbitrarily) sends all other variables to 1.
For each constant c, let
Bc
be the (E , ec,Hc)-branch, and let
Γc
be the run cospelled by Bc, i.e. (by Lemma 5.1) the Hc vs. E run on ec.
Next, for any constant c, let
‡c
be the interpretation constructed from Bc and Γc in the way we constructed the inter-
pretation † from B and Γ in:
Subsection 9.4 if Bc is short;
Subsection 9.5 if Bc is long.
From the results of Subsections 9.4 and 9.5 we thus have:
For any constant c, Wn(32)
‡c
〈Γc〉 = ⊥. (37)
Consider any atom A˙(x) of (32). For each particular constant c, the predicate
A˙‡c(x) is unary, depending only on x. But if here c is seen as a variable and, as such,
renamed into z, then the predicate becomes binary, depending on x and z. Let us
denote such a predicate by A¨(x, z). That is, we define A¨(x, z) as the predicate such
that, for any constants a and c,
A¨(a, c) = A˙‡c(a).
We now define our ultimate
counterinterpretation ⋆
by stipulating that, for any atom A˙(x) of (32),7 A˙⋆(x) is nothing but the above pred-
icate A¨(x, z). Note that, unlike ‡c (any particular constant c), ⋆ is not a perfect
interpretation, for A˙⋆(x) depends on the “hidden” variable z.
Claim 9.8 For any constant c, (32)‡c = ec[(32)
⋆].
7As noted for † in Subsection 9.3, how ⋆ interprets the atoms that are not in (32) is irrelevant and
not worth bothering at this point.
54
Proof. Consider any predicate letter A˙ of (32), and any constant c. We claim
that (
⊔xA˙(x)
)‡c
= ec[
(
⊔xA˙(x)
)⋆
]. (38)
The games on the two sides of the above equation can be rewritten as ⊔xA˙‡c(x)
and ec[⊔xA˙⋆(x)], respectively. ec[⊔xA˙⋆(x)] can be further rewritten as ec[⊔xA¨(x, z)].
Thus, in order to verify (38), we need to show that
⊔xA˙‡c(x) = ec[⊔xA¨(x, z)]. (39)
As noted earlier,⊔xA˙‡c(x) is a constant game due to the fact that the interpretation
‡c is perfect. So, it is its own instance, and ⊔xA˙‡c(x) can be safely written instead of
e[⊔xA˙‡c(x)] for whatever (irrelevant) valuation e. Of course, the two games of (39)
have the same legal runs, with every such run being 〈〉 or 〈⊤a〉 for some constant a. So,
we only need to verify that the Wn components of those two games are also identical.
And, of course, considering only legal runs when comparing the two Wn components
is sufficient. Furthermore, the empty run is a ⊥-won run of both games. So, we only
need to focus on legal runs of length 1. Consider any such run 〈⊤a〉. By the definition
of ⊔, Wn⊔xA˙‡c(x)〈⊤a〉 = ⊤ iff WnA˙‡c(a)〈〉 = ⊤; in turn, WnA˙‡c(a)〈〉 = ⊤ means
nothing but that A˙‡c(a) is true; and, by the definition of A¨, A˙‡c(a) = A¨(a, c). Thus,
Wn⊔xA˙
‡c(x)〈⊤a〉 = ⊤ iff A¨(a, c) is true. (40)
Next, again by the definition of ⊔, we have
Wn⊔xA¨(x,z)ec 〈⊤a〉 =Wn
A¨(a,z)
ec
〈〉.
As A¨(a, z) only depends on z and ec sends this variable to c, we also have ec[A¨(a, z)] =
A¨(a, c). And, of course, WnA¨(a,c)〈〉 = ⊤ means nothing but that A¨(a, c) is true. So,
Wn⊔xA¨(x,z)ec 〈⊤a〉 = ⊤ iff A¨(a, c) is true.
The above, together with (40), implies
Wn⊔xA˙
‡c(x)〈⊤a〉 =Wn⊔xA¨(x,z)ec 〈⊤a〉,
thus completing our proof of (39) and hence of (38).
Now, by induction, (38) extends from formulas of the form ⊔xA˙(x) to all more
complex subformulas of (32) including (32) itself, meaning that (32)‡c = ec[(32)
⋆].
The steps of this induction are straightforward, because each of the operations ⋆, ‡c
and ec[. . .] commutes with each of the connectives ∧, ◦
| and →. ✷
Putting (37) and Claim 9.8 together, we find that, for any constant c, Γc is a ⊥-won
run of ec[(32)
⋆]. Now, remember that Γc is the Hc vs. E run on ec, according to Lemma
5.1 meaning that Γc is the run spelled by an ec-computation branch of Hc. So, every
Hc loses (32)⋆ on valuation ec, i.e. no Hc wins (32)⋆. But every HPM is Hc for some
c. Thus, no HPM wins (32)⋆. In other words, (32) is not valid.
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This almost completes our proof of the main Claim 9.2 and hence our proof of the
main Lemma 9.1 and hence our proof of the completeness of Int. What remains to
verify for the official completion of our proof of Theorem 2.6 is that ⋆ is of complexity
ΣB1 . Such a verification is given in the following subsection.
9.7 The complexity of the counterinterpretation
The counterinterpretation ⋆ constructed in the previous subsection interprets each atom
A˙(x) of (32) as the binary predicate A¨(x, z). With “true in the sense of Subsection 9.4
(resp. 9.5)” below understood as truth in the sense of the corresponding subsection
where Bc is taken in the role of B (and, accordingly, Γc in the role of Γ) when con-
structing the counterinterpretation † from it, the meaning of the proposition A¨(a, c)
for any given constants a, c is in fact the disjunction of the following two statements:
1. “Bc is short and A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 9.4”;
2. “Bc is long and A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 9.5”.
Note that arbitrarily long initial segments of Bc can be effectively constructed from
c. This can be done by first constructing the machine Hc from number c, and then
tracing, step by step, how the play between Hc and E evolves on valuation ec according
to the scenario described in the proof idea for Lemma 5.1. This makes it clear that the
predicate “Bc is long” (with c here treated as a variable) is of complexity Σ1, because it
says nothing but that there is a computation step in Bc at which ⌊W˘ ⌋ gets matchingly
grounded.
Next, “Bc is short” is just the negation of “Bc is long”.
Next, some thought can show “A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 9.4” (with
a, together with the hidden c, here treated as a variable) to mean nothing but that
there is no computation step in Bc at which A˙(a) becomes the content of some positive
non-matchingly grounded residual molecule of the then-current position. So this is the
negation of a Σ1-predicate.
Finally, “A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 9.5” means that there is a —
lexicographically smallest — open chain C hitting ⌊W˘⌋, and A˙(a) is not the content of
anything in C. With a little thought we can see that, to find such a chain C, it would
be sufficient to trace Bc only up to the computation step at which ⌊W˘ ⌋ gets grounded.
So, the complexity of the predicate “A˙(a) is true in the sense of Subsection 9.5” is Σ1.
To summarize, where A˙(x) is an atom of (32), A¨(x, z), i.e A˙⋆(x), is indeed a Boolean
combination of Σ1-predicates. As for all other elementary atoms, we may make arbi-
trary assumptions — without affecting the incomputability of (32)⋆ — about how
they are interpreted by ⋆. So, we assume that they, too, are interpreted as Boolean
combinations of Σ1-predicates.
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10 Finishing the completeness proof for intuitionis-
tic logic
Suppose K is an Int-formula with Int 6⊢ K. Let F be the dedollarization of K.
According to Lemma 6.2, Int 6⊢ F . LetG⇒W be the standardization of F . By Lemma
7.4, Int 6⊢ G⇒ W . Hence, by the completeness of Int with respect to Kripke semantics,
there is a model K with K /||≡G⇒W . Obviously here we may assume that K||≡G and
K /||≡W . Let n be the size of K. Then, by Lemma 9.1, there is an interpretation ◦ of
complexity ⊔ΣB1 such that 6|= D◦, where D is the n-desequentization of G⇒W . But
then, by Lemma 8.1, 6|= F ◦. But then, by Lemma 6.3, there is an interpretation ∗ of
the same complexity ⊔ΣB1 such that 6|= K∗. This proves the completeness of Int in
the strong sense of clause (b) of Theorem 2.6, and here our story ends.
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